“In a broader sense the bin Laden tracking unit inside the Counterterrorist Center had seen this [the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa on August 7, 1998] coming. The center’s analysts and officers worked eight to twelve hours a day in government cubicles reading and analyzing translated text from bin Laden’s press conferences, television interviews, and intercepted messages and telephone calls. It seemed obvious to the dozen of them that bin Laden meant what he said: He had decided to launch a new jihad against the United States, and he would attack American targets wherever he could reach them. Yet the bin Laden unit’s officers had been unable to persuade their bosses to act on the plan to raid [al Qaeda training camp] Tarnak Farm [Afghanistan]. Some of them were devastated and angry as they watched the television images of death and rescue in Africa. One of the bin Laden unit’s female analysts confronted CIA director [George] Tenet: ‘You are responsible for those deaths because you didn’t act on the information we had, when we could have gotten him,’ she told him, according to an American official familiar with the accusation.”

 – Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, Page 405