“In a memo to the Principals [the members of the National Security Council excluding President Bush], dated August 6 [2002], [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld highlighted the risks of a bad [Iraqi weapons] inspections arrangement. He reiterated that inspections should ‘not be considered an end in themselves, but rather the means to an end’–the end being Iraq’s actual disarmament: ‘The obstacles to achieving that end have grown during the past four years during which no inspections took place in Iraq. We must keep our eye on the ball and ensure that the circumstances under which inspections resume, if they do, are such as to facilitate total Iraqi WMD disarmament, as required by [UN Security Council Resolution] 687. The U.S. must make a public statement of this position as soon as possible. This is necessary to prevent confusion and to preempt the move that Saddam…may be preparing to cut an unsatisfactory deal with the UN on inspections.’ ”
– Douglas Feith, War and Decision, Page 302