On August 20, 1998, “U.S. submarines stationed in the Arabian Sea off Pakistan’s coastline launched 75 or so Tomahawk cruise missiles at two bin Laden-linked targets. The primary target was a complex of training camps in eastern Afghanistan, near Khost, where, according to CIA intelligence, bin Laden was meeting with his top aides. The second target was a factory in Khartoum [Sudan] that the CIA believed was producing chemical weapons for bin Laden. The attack demolished both sites and killed about 20 men, a handful of them members of al Qaeda. But the mission was not a success. …According to the CIA, its intelligence was off by a few hours, and bin Laden and his senior people escaped without harm. …The attacks almost certainly caused bin Laden to heighten security arrangements, making the already elusive leader even harder to pin down. …But the U.S. lost the most on the public relations front. By going after and not getting bin Laden, the U.S. elevated his stature in the Arab world.”
– John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, The Cell, Pages 210-211