According to information from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, delivered July 7, 2004, “With regard to the most important intelligence assessments, such as the question of whether Saddam Hussein actually possessed mobile biological-weapons laboratories, sought aluminum tubes for nuclear weapons, or was working on a program to attack the United States with chemical or biological weapons on drone aircraft, the committee was unanimous: none of those things was true and the CIA’s analysis was completely wrong. Also unsubstantiated by intelligence reporting was the claim that Iraq likely possessed chemical and biological weapons. ‘Most of the major key judgments’ in the controversial October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate ‘either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting,’ the committee report declared. ‘A series of failures, particularly in analytic tradecraft, led to the mischaracterization of intelligence.’ ”
– James Bamford, A Pretext for War, Pages 381-382