“In May [14-20] 1999, over a five-day period, several sources reported details on bin Laden’s comings and goings in and around Kandahar [Afghanistan]. This was, by consensus, the most reliable intelligence possible. The military was ready with its cruise missiles. There were three opportunities to fire on bin Laden in thirty-six hours. ‘This was in our strike zone,’ a senior military officer would tell the 9/11 Commission. ‘It was a fat pitch, a home run.’ As the Commission’s report elaborated, ‘He expected the missiles to fly. When the decision came back that they should stand down, not shoot, the officer said, *We all just slumped.” ‘ He told the Commission that ‘he knew of no one at the Pentagon or the CIA who thought it was a bad gamble. Bin Laden *should have been a dead man* that night.’ “
– John Farmer, The Ground Truth, Page 36