According to the Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005: ” ‘We found no evidence that the doubts [of the reliability of Iraqi informant Curveball] were conveyed by CIA leadership to policymakers in general–or Secretary [of State Colin] Powell in particular. …It is unclear precisely how and why these serious concerns about Curveball never reached Secretary Powell, despite his and his staff’s vigorous efforts over several days in February 2003 to strip out every dubious piece of information in his proposed speech to the United Nations. It is clear, however, that serious concerns about Curveball were widely known at CIA in the months leading up to Secretary Powell’s speech. In our view, the failure to convey these concerns to senior management, or, if such concerns were in fact raised to senior management, the failure to pass that information to Secretary Powell, represents a serious failure of management and leadership.’ ”
– Tyler Drumheller with Elaine Monaghan, On The Brink, Pages 266-267