According to the Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005: ” ‘The Intelligence Community fundamentally misjudged the status of Iraq’s BW [biological weapons] programs. …the central basis for the Intelligence Community’s pre-war assessments about Iraq’s BW program was the reporting of a single human source, Curveball. This single source, whose reporting came into question in late 2002, later proved to be a fabricator. …Curveball’s reporting became a central part of the Intelligence Community’s pre-war assessments through a serious breakdown in several aspects of the intelligence process. The Curveball story is at the same time one of poor asset validation by our human collection agencies; of a tendency of analysts to believe that which fits their theories; of inadequate communication between the Intelligence Community and the policymakers it serves; and, ultimately, of poor leadership and management.’ ”
– Tyler Drumheller with Elaine Monaghan, On The Brink, Pages 242-243