“[A] section of the findings of the presidential commission chaired by Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, released March 31, 2005… report that the intelligence community was ‘dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction,’ … It pinned the blame for this failure on the community’s ‘inability to collect good information about Iraq’s WMD programs, serious errors in analyzing what information it could gather, and a failure to make clear just how much of its analysis was based on assumptions, rather than good evidence.’ It added: ‘After a thorough review, the Commission found no indication that the Intelligence Community distorted the evidence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. What the intelligence professionals told you about Saddam Hussein’s programs was what they believed. They were simply wrong.’ “
– Tyler Drumheller with Elaine Monaghan, On The Brink, Pages 234-235