As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “242. Mr Straw wrote to Mr Blair on 11 March setting out his firm conclusion that:
‘If we cannot gain nine votes and be sure of no veto, we should not push our second resolution to a vote. The political and diplomatic consequences for the UK would be significantly worse to have our … resolution defeated … than if we camp on 1441 …’
243. Mr Straw set out his reasoning in some detail, including that:
-Although in earlier discussion he had ‘warmed to the idea’ that it was worth pushing the issue to a vote ‘if we had nine votes and faced only a French veto’, the more he ‘thought about this, the worse an idea it becomes’.
-A veto by France only was ‘in practice less likely than two or even three vetoes’.
-The ‘best, least risky way to gain a moral majority’ was ‘by the *Kosovo route* – essentially what I am recommending. The key to our moral legitimacy then was the matter never went to a vote – but everyone knew the reason for this was that Russia would have vetoed.’
244. Mr Straw suggested that the UK should adopt a strategy based on the argument that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, and that the last three meetings of the Security Council met the requirement for Security Council consideration of reports of non-compliance.
245. Mr Straw also identified the need for a ‘Plan B’ for the UK not to participate in military action in the event that the Government failed to secure a majority in the Parliamentary Labour Party for military action.
244. Mr Straw suggested that the UK should adopt a strategy based on the argument that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, and that the last three meetings of the Security Council met the requirement for Security Council consideration of reports of non-compliance.
245. Mr Straw also identified the need for a ‘Plan B’ for the UK not to participate in military action in the event that the Government failed to secure a majority in the Parliamentary Labour Party for military action.
246. Mr Straw concluded:
‘We will obviously need to discuss all this, but I thought it best to put it in your mind as event[s] could move fast. And what I propose is a great deal better than the alternatives. When Bush graciously accepted your offer to be with him all the way, he wanted you alive not dead!’ “
– Commissioned by the Prime Minister The Right Honourable Gordon Brown MP, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary,” IraqInquiry.org.uk, March 11, 2003