The Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute released a report titled ‘Reconstructing Iraq’ in February 2003. “The report is breathtaking in its prescience and in its detailed examination of the ‘real and serious’ ‘possibility of the United States winning the war and losing the peace in Iraq.’ Suspicion of U.S. motives was likely to increase in postwar Iraq, the study found, even if the war itself ended rapidly, with light casualties; problems would be acute if the United States had to handle the bulk of the occupation itself, rather than turn it over to a ‘postwar international force.’ Moreover, the analysis foresaw resistance to what would likely be viewed as imperial domination by the Judeo-Christian West. Warning of the dangers of tribal and ethnic conflict, the report noted the widespread presence of private, armed militias. It cited Shiite Islamist terrorism in Lebanon as an example of ‘strategies to alienate Iraqis who are initially neutral toward a US occupation,’ and it expected that terrorists in Iraq would utilize suicide bombings. In predicting that the exiled opposition would not be welcomed back as the country’s new leaders, it quoted an expert warning that Ahmed Chalabi and his [Iraqi National Congress] party were ‘extremely unpopular in Iraq.’ The report said the Iraqi Army could serve as a ‘unifying force’ in the postwar period, and speculated that demobilized soldiers would affiliate with violent elements if the army was disbanded. The longer an American occupation persisted, the greater the possibility of terrorism by Iraqis trying ‘to hasten the departure of US forces.’ Yet it also anticipated the dilemma the United States would find itself in: ‘At the same time, a premature withdrawal from Iraq could lead to instability and perhaps even civil war.’ This is why it stressed mobilizing the ‘massive resources’ that would ‘need to be focused on this effort before the first shot is fired,’ to prepare ‘for the postwar rehabilitation of the Iraqi political system.’ ” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]
– Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory, Pages 283-284