In his report to Congress on October 2, 2003, Iraq Survey Group supervisor David “Kay stressed that Saddam had preserved the technical cadres for WMD work: ‘According to documents and testimony of Iraqi scientists, some of the key technical groups from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program remained largely intact, performing work on nuclear-relevant dual-use technologies within the Military Industrial Commission.’ Some scientists from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program testified that ‘they believed that these working groups were preserved in order to allow a reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program, but none of the scientists could produce official orders or plans to support their belief.’ One Iraqi scientist stated that ‘it was a *common understanding* among the scientists that material was being preserved for reconstitution of nuclear weapons-related work.’ (Their belief was later confirmed in the Iraq Survey Group’s final report, which summarized Saddam’s strategy: ‘Keep nuclear scientists together at IAEC [Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission] in order to pool their skills and have them available when needed.’) ”
– Douglas Feith, War and Decision, Page 472