In October 2010, the CIA conducted a study of Afghanistan, and its ‘changes in security, government presence, and development.‘ “The assessment was based on statistics–among them the number of insurgent attacks and the number of Afghan security forces in the area–as well as input from the CIA’s network of Afghan informants. White House officials regarded it as ‘the report card on the surge.’ The CIA’s conclusion was that Afghanistan was ‘trending to stalemate.’ The report…showed that gains in the south resulting from additional troops were offset by losses to the Taliban in the eastern and northern parts of the country. ‘There has been no net progress,’ I [journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran] was told by a senior White House official who had read the assessment. In asking for the surge, military commanders had asserted that security improvements in the districts where the new troops were initially concentrated would be like inkblots that would expand across the map of Afghanistan. That hadn’t occurred. ‘Where we went, we made a difference. But not next door,’ the official said. ‘The surge worked locally, but it did not have the nation-wide effect that was advertised.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]
– Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America, Pages 326-327