According to the Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005: ” ‘The October [1] 2002 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] reflected the shift from the late-1990s assessments that Iraq could have biological weapons [BW] to the definitive conclusion that Iraq ‘has’ biological weapons, and that its BW program was larger and more advanced than before the Gulf War. Information about Iraq’s dual-use facilities and its failure to account fully for previously declared stockpiles contributed to this shift in assessments. The information that Iraq had mobile BW production units, however, was instrumental in adjusting upward the assessment of Iraq’s BW threat. And for this conclusion, the NIE relied primarily on reporting from [Iraqi informant] Curveball, who, as noted, provided a large volume of reporting through Defense HUMINT [human intelligence] channels regarding mobile BW production facilities in Iraq.’ ”
– Tyler Drumheller with Elaine Monaghan, On The Brink, Pages 237-238