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**KILLING THEM WITH KINDNESS:**

**A Softer Approach to Preventing Violent Extremism  
and Countering Radicalization in the War on Terrorism**

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*“We can keep fighting and we can keep killing them, but if somebody’s not working on draining the swamp, we’re never going to be finished with this.” - General Peter Pace<sup>i</sup>*

## **INTRODUCTION**

As the war on radical Islamic extremism (hereafter the War on Terrorism) enters its second decade, military strategists and policymakers have begun to ask, how will the conflict end?<sup>ii</sup> With more than 100,000 Islamic militants detained and imprisoned around the world, democratic countries like the United States have found it increasingly difficult to justify indefinite detention, both fiscally and morally.<sup>iii</sup> Although unsustainable in the long term, repatriation without addressing the militant’s ideological outlook or willingness to engage in violent behavior, is equally problematic, and has resulted in some individuals returning to terrorism upon release.<sup>iv</sup> This begs the questions, beyond killing and capturing terrorists, what other means of preventing violent extremism and countering radicalization are available to the United States? How have other countries effectively deterred terrorists from committing violent acts, and how have they enticed them into renouncing their radicalized ideology? And finally, how can lessons learned from these programs be broadly applied to America’s War on Terrorism?

In her seminal work, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, Audrey Kurth Cronin outlines the historical tendency of terrorism to fail.<sup>v</sup> She outlines five options in the absence of terrorists achieving their goals. Beyond killing, capturing or otherwise repressing terrorists with force, Cronin suggests terrorism ends when there is an unsuccessful generational transition, or a successful transition to legitimate political participation.<sup>vi</sup> Those engaged in counter-terrorism efforts continue to search for effective means through which they might ensure this unsuccessful generational transition or stimulate a

transition towards political legitimacy. Over the last decade, these tactics have increasingly evolved from “hard” to “soft” counter-terrorism measures. A “hard” approach to counter-terrorism entails employing strictly military or law enforcement techniques, including the use of force, intelligence and surveillance, as well as killing, capturing or detaining terrorists.<sup>vii</sup> A “soft” counter-terrorism approach, “seeks to undo the radicalization process by engineering the individual’s return to moderate society, usually by providing them with a stable support network, probing their original reasons for radicalizing, and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and social contacts.”<sup>viii</sup> Soft counter-terrorism measures, what one researcher labels “cognitive immunization” policies, can be understood as part of a broader “war of ideas” against terrorism and those susceptible to the terrorist’s message.<sup>ix</sup> The vast literature on soft counter-terrorism methods makes mention of government, community, and religious-based efforts in over 50 countries, emphasizing the growing influence of this approach in the ongoing battle against extremist violence and religious, as well as other forms, of political and social radicalization.<sup>x</sup>

## **UNDERSTANDING the DISCOURSE**

Before we discuss the way in which states have pursued soft counter-terrorism tactics, we must begin by defining the nuanced terminology employed for the purpose of this research. To understand counter-terrorism, it is crucial to understand what is being countered, or how terrorism is defined. With hundreds of official designations in use today, this research borrows from Alex P. Schmid’s work on a definitional consensus, and refers to terrorism as,

A doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial

practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.<sup>xi</sup>

Terrorism is a threat-based communicative process.<sup>xii</sup> It rarely occurs as a single act, but rather as part of a larger campaign of action by irregular or insurgent forces engaged in asymmetric warfare, wherein the enemy is perceived as having a distinct military advantage.<sup>xiii</sup> The direct victims are typically non-combatants but they are meant to serve as “message generators” for a larger audience, consisting of the media, parties to the conflict, and sympathetic observers who might be recruited based on the perceived success of the violent tactics employed.<sup>xiv</sup> The motivation and intent of terrorism is context-based (i.e. grievances and aims are contingent upon the actors employing said tactics and the social economic, cultural and political situation in which the act of terrorism occurs).<sup>xv</sup> The contentious nature of the definition stems from the perception of its application in a given situation. It implies that for some, a terrorist might be more appropriately labeled a “freedom fighter” or perhaps a “criminal, crusader or crazy.”<sup>xvi</sup> Violent extremism and terrorism are often used interchangeably, but violent extremism is broader in scope and can encompass non-terrorist groups.<sup>xvii</sup>

Engaging in acts of terrorism requires an individual undergo a process of radicalization. Borrowing from Omar Ashour, radicalization is defined as, “a process of relative change in which an [individual] or group undergoes ideological and/or behavioral transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilization of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence.”<sup>xviii</sup> Furthermore, radicalization can be cognitive or

behavioral: “cognitive radicalization is the process through which an individual adopts ideas that are severely at odds with those of the mainstream, refutes the legitimacy of the existing social order, and seeks to replace it with a new structure based on a completely different belief system.”<sup>xxix</sup> Radicalization becomes behavioral when, “an individual takes the additional step of using violence to further the views derived from cognitive radicalism.”<sup>xxx</sup>

Given the aforementioned definition, counter-terrorism therefore refers to the means – including practices and policies, tactics, techniques, and strategies – by which terrorism is confronted and averted. Counter-terrorism programs can refer to institutionalized or ad hoc efforts, emerging from, or administered by, government (federal, state or local), law enforcement or community groups, or a combination of the aforementioned groups, with the aim of preventing violent extremism and countering radicalization through soft and/or hard tactics. For the purposes of this research, I define ‘programs’ broadly, “describing a wide variety of policies to facilitate disengagement... Alternatively, what constitutes a ‘programme’ [*sic*] may essentially just be a legal framework for facilitating reduced sentencing in exchange for repentances and collaboration with the authorities.”<sup>xxxi</sup> Today, counter-terrorism is an international legal obligation. In the days following the 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S., the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution mandating that countries adopt specific measures to combat, prevent and suppress acts of terrorism for the sake of transnational security.<sup>xxii</sup> Counter-terrorism is therefore an integral part of global governance.

Counter-terrorism strategies consist of counter-radicalization as well as de-radicalization efforts. Counter-radicalization typically refers to preventative methods while de-radicalization is reactive, referring to methods applied to an individual (or group of individuals) post-radicalization.<sup>xxiii</sup> The United Nations refers to counter-radicalization as policies and programs

that address, “some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path of terrorism. It is used broadly to refer to a package of social, political, legal education and economic programmes [*sic*] specifically designed to deter disaffected... individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists.”<sup>xxiv</sup> John Horgan defines de-radicalization as, “the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity.”<sup>xxv</sup> Therefore, de-radicalization programs, are “generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of re-integrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence.”<sup>xxvi</sup> Counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programs can be secular or religious in orientation, and seek to modify and undermine individual and group behavioral or ideological processes.<sup>xxvii</sup>

Horgan makes a further distinction between de-radicalization and disengagement, characterizing de-radicalization as an actual shift in the individual’s cognitive or normative understanding, while disengagement implies a behavioral change, in which an individual may no longer be an active participant in violent activities but may still maintain their radical ideologies or beliefs.<sup>xxviii</sup> Importantly, disengagement does not imply de-radicalization; “a disengaged terrorist may not necessarily be repentant or ‘deradicalized’ [*sic*] at all. Often physical disengagement may not result in any concomitant change or reduction in the ideological support or, indeed, the social and psychological control that the particular ideology exerts on the individual.”<sup>xxix</sup> Disengagement can be an individual or a collective act, a member may leave the group and no longer participate in the organization’s violent activism, or a group may, “abandon their use of terrorist methods or end their terrorist campaign.” This process occurs voluntarily, involuntarily or as a combination of both.<sup>xxx</sup> Andrew Silke suggests the real goal in preventing

violent extremism and countering radicalization should be disengagement, noting that deradicalization implies the onus of the individual's actions are a result of their ideological outlook, while discounting the numerous other factors at play.<sup>xxx1</sup>

## **A SOFT APPROACH to COUNTER-TERRORISM**

Preventing violent extremism and countering radicalization is not a new concept, and has precedence in wartime and post-conflict situations (both inter- and intra-state). It has also been used with comparator groups such as criminal gangs, religious cults, and racially-charged organizations, dating back to World War II when Allied forces instituted “de-Nazification” programs in Germany.<sup>xxxii</sup> Programs to counter violent Islamic extremism and radicalization have taken on an orientation that is distinctly Arab and Muslim or European. As Christopher Boucek et al. writes, “European countries emphasize counter-radicalization, and their efforts to rehabilitate radical Islamists are a by-product of preventive initiatives. By contrast, most Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian governments pursue both counter-radicalization and deradicalization initiatives.”<sup>xxxiii</sup> Additionally, Arab and Muslim or European efforts can be broadly categorized as methodologically religious versus methodologically secular, respectively. This distinction stems from the ability of a particular government to be an authority on Islam; in the Middle East and Asia the separation between religion and state is less pronounced than in Europe, and in some cases, a specific religion is sanctioned by the state. Successful programs in the Middle East and Southeast Asia therefore have a distinctly religious component to their programs because rehabilitation and reintegration back into mainstream society requires the acceptance of mainstream values and therefore acceptance of a mainstream (or state-sponsored) version of Islam.

The literature on preventing violent extremism and countering radicalization entails numerous programs in existence that use soft techniques and purport to be successful, but because most lack identifiable metrics, results remain primarily inconclusive. Both Horgan and Kurt Braddock warn that in assessing these programs it is impossible to discern implications or expectations. For none have, “formally identified valid and reliable indicators of successful de-radicalization or even disengagement... Consequently, any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of any such program is beset with a myriad of challenges that are as much conceptual as they are practical.”<sup>xxxiv</sup> With that caveat, the following section will provide a brief overview and assessment of the anecdotal evidence available for those programs deemed most successful in the pursuit of preventing violent extremism and countering radicalization.

### **A MIDDLE EASTERN APPROACH to SOFT COUNTER-TERRORISM**

Preventing violent extremism and countering radicalization in the Middle East blends together a unique mix of coercion, co-option and financial incentives to cajole terror suspects into renouncing violent extremism. These programs have two components: one being, “the intellectual/cognitive component including exposure to counterarguments,” and the second, “a motivational component based on material support, job training, and assistance to families of detained militants, all offering an alternative opportunity for honorable existence and a sense of personal significance.”<sup>xxxv</sup> The most ambitious and successful program in the Middle East comes from Saudi Arabia, which evolved from the realization by the government that, “focusing on the elimination of terrorists, rather than on their radical ideology in general, was misguided and counterproductive.”<sup>xxxvi</sup> In addition to a traditional hard counter-terrorism approach, the Saudi government also advances a Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAC) strategy that



utilizes counseling, dialogue and education to prevent violent extremism and to counter radicalization.<sup>xxxvii</sup> The Saudi program is a multi-pronged strategy focusing on the rehabilitation and reintegration of individual terrorists, as well as the prevention of further radicalization in society by addressing educational and media related content.

The detainee counseling program or *al Munasahah*, created in 2004, addresses the welfare and rehabilitation of radicalized detainees. The outreach strategy is based,

Not on punishment or retribution but on a presumption of benevolence; that is, the state does not seek to exact revenge through this program. It begins from the assumption that the suspects were lied to and misled by extremists into straying from true Islam. Saudi security officials assert that extremists prey on people who want to know more about their faith, then corrupt them through exposure to violent extremist ideologies... Counseling is thus presented as help for victims of radicalization, not as punishment for transgressors.<sup>xxxviii</sup>

Prisoners are separated into groups - those who committed or planned acts of terrorism, those who provided limited aid to terrorists, and terrorist sympathizers - in order to maximize the potential of the process, and avoid corruption by “hardcore” militants or those less radicalized and therefore, presumably, more easily rehabilitated.<sup>xxxix</sup> Detainees are exposed to psychologists, psychiatrists, social scientists, and researchers who assess their mental capacity and well being, in addition to their potential to successfully complete the program, and upon completion, evaluate the authenticity of repentance. These practitioners also assess the welfare of the detainee’s family, seeking, “to offset physical and social hardships caused by incarceration and

to lessen the chances that other family members will become radicalized” by providing basic services and financial resources.”<sup>xli</sup> Prisoners undergo religious rehabilitation, working with qualified Muslim clerics, scholars and professors to learn a mainstream (or state-sponsored) version of Islam through a six-week long religious course, culminating with a final exam upon completion.<sup>xlii</sup> Detainees are then released to an after-care facility where they remain engaged with medical and religious officials while beginning the process of reintegration back into society through family visits, team building exercises and art therapy.<sup>xliii</sup> Upon their final release, detainees continue to work with rehabilitation officials, remaining under strict surveillance by the state, but also receive incentives to remain on track, including educational opportunities, vocational training, stipends, and even arranged marriages.<sup>xliiii</sup> The Saudi government claims that approximately 3,000 prisoners have taken part in the counseling program, and approximately half have renounced their former beliefs and have been released.<sup>xliiv</sup> The program claims to have a success rate of 80 to 90 percent and a recidivist rate of two percent or less, though the government admits there might be infractions of which they are unaware.<sup>xliv</sup> The program is designed exclusively for men, though the government has admitted to counseling female security suspects in their homes.<sup>xlvi</sup>

The Saudi government has also implemented a comprehensive social program that includes public education and national solidarity campaigns, Islamic dialogue conventions, and the monitoring of Imam’s and teachers in mosques and schools.<sup>xlvii</sup> State sponsored television airs programs that emphasize the negative aspects of radical *Jihad* and feature stories of repentant militants.<sup>xlviii</sup> And due to the increasing role of the Internet in the radicalization process, the Saudi government launched the *al Sakinah* or Tranquility campaign, aimed at undermining extremists online.<sup>xlix</sup> As Boucek writes, “similar to how the country’s counseling

program seeks to help detainees abandon extremist beliefs through face-to-face discussions, the *Sakinah* Campaign works to erode the intellectual support for extremism online.”<sup>l</sup> Initiated in 2004, the campaign consists of male and female volunteers – including religious officials, academic scholars, mental health practitioners and other specialists – who log onto extremist websites, seek out those looking for knowledge, and engage them in a virtual dialogue, while simultaneously depicting the fallacies of radicalized Islamic ideology.<sup>li</sup> This process also allows volunteers to catalog extremist materials, observe trends, and analyze information used by terrorists to radicalize individuals online.<sup>lii</sup> The Saudi government claims that the campaign has engaged in approximately 1,600 conversations, and has convinced almost 1,000 individuals, worldwide, to renounce their radical ideology across 1,500 extremist websites.<sup>liii</sup> As an ancillary to the program, the government created a website for the Council of Senior *Ulama* in 2006 that provides, “quick access to *fatwas* issued by authorized scholars... enabling Muslims to ask questions on various topics and get replies from the Council of Senior *Ulama*.”<sup>liv</sup> But as Boucek notes of all aspects of the operation, “this is very much a Saudi solution to a Saudi problem.”<sup>lv</sup>

The American-run program in Iraqi detention centers has been among the most celebrated successes in the Middle East, spurring a similar program by U.S. forces in Afghanistan.<sup>lvi</sup> From 2007 until its closing in 2009, the U.S. detention facility at Camp Bucca, was home to a cutting-edge rehabilitation and reintegration program. It sought to de-radicalize more than 23,000 Iraqi inmates, including 800 youths, imprisoned by American troops during the course of the invasion, and subsequent war in Iraq.<sup>lvii</sup> Like the Saudi program, the Iraqi one separated detainees based on level of commitment to violent extremism, in this case removing the “hard core” militants (approximately five percent to 15 percent of all detainees) from the moderates and juveniles.<sup>lviii</sup> The program was completely voluntary but incentives, including early release and/or amnesty,

were offered to participants.<sup>lix</sup> As one individual involved with the creation and execution of the program declared, it was,

The first of its kind to incorporate a comprehensive religious and psychological approach from the start – combining religious challenge by Muslim imams with psychological counseling to inmates to help address the many psychological traumas and vulnerabilities that led them to involvement with terrorism and insurgency. The goal of the program is to challenge and move the detainees to make a profound shift from embracing violence to adopting a nonviolent stance.<sup>lx</sup>

The program included a variety of ‘rehabilitation modes’ including, religious, social and family, educational, vocational, and recreational.<sup>lxi</sup> It aimed at achieving one simple objective in addressing a detainee’s psychological, physical and material needs, his ideological proclivities and civic understanding. As program founder Major General Douglas Stone stated, “if a detainee returns to the fight, it is a failure in the process. If a detainee assists in reducing the fight, it is considered a success in the process.”<sup>lxii</sup> Approximately 10,000 prisoners were released during the first nine months of the program, and only 100 were re-arrested.<sup>lxiii</sup> Another 8,000 were released before the program’s end, with a recidivism rate of 1.5 percent or less.<sup>lxiv</sup> Similar programs have been initiated elsewhere in the region. Yemen was an early pioneer of de-radicalization, but their program lacked the requisite aftercare and focused exclusively on detainees refraining from violence at home. This led them, in many cases, to enlist in militant forces outside of Yemen upon their release.<sup>lxv</sup> Meanwhile Jordan’s program suffered from a lack of credibility, as detainees did not view the Islamic officials as epistemologically authoritative.<sup>lxvi</sup>

## **A SOUTHEAST ASIAN APPROACH to SOFT COUNTER-TERRORISM**

With a particular emphasis on ‘social harmony,’ preventing violent extremism and countering radicalization in Southeast Asia has a distinct set of characteristics, emphasizing societal interests, community morals, and family values in an effort to rehabilitate and reintegrate militants. In Singapore, the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) was created in 2003 following a wave of arrests that disrupted terrorist cells across the country.<sup>lxvii</sup> It consists of an all-volunteer force of Islamic scholars and teachers who study the radical ideology of *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) and engage terrorist detainees and their families in counseling sessions.<sup>lxviii</sup> From the time of its inception until 2007, the RRG claims to have engaged in over 800 counseling sessions, with an additional 100 sessions for family members, in order to help imprisoned extremists, “understand Islam in the Singapore context.”<sup>lxix</sup> Authorities not only enlist family members in the rehabilitation of detainees, but also ensure that detainees and their families were cared for through educational, financial and vocational opportunities.<sup>lxx</sup> Psychological assessment was also incorporated into the rehabilitation process. An Aftercare Service Group (ASG) provided for post-release care, though it was not made mandatory and therefore the onus of continued rehabilitation falls upon the community, who are responsible for keeping former detainees from returning to terrorism.<sup>lxxi</sup> The government has also used religious authorities to reach out to the community through publications that articulate accepted Islamic beliefs, national dialogue conventions at schools, workplaces and mosques, and the creation of a variety of Web sites and blogs to counter the spread of radical ideology online.<sup>lxxii</sup> Singapore has not suffered a terrorist attack in over two decades, and although this cannot be directly attributable to the aforementioned rehabilitation program over the past 10 years, release and recidivism numbers

(according to the government) appear to support claims of success: of the more than 70 individuals arrested between 2003 and 2009, more than 40 have been released on restriction orders and just one re-arrest has been reported.<sup>lxxiii</sup> Singaporean officials briefed their U.S. counterparts on their program, which has been called the “ideal” model, and is credited – in addition to the Saudi program – as being integral in the creation of the now defunct American program in Iraq.<sup>lxxiv</sup>

Conversely, Indonesia pursues a more ad-hoc policy towards JI that emerged as a bottom-up strategy from within the prison system. This non-institutionalized program consists of two core tenets: “only radicals can deradicalize [*sic*] militant *jihadi* prisoners because they have credibility and that the state must reestablish trust and legitimacy (through incentives, etc.) to foster the cooperation of former militants/terrorists.”<sup>lxxv</sup> Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iraq or Singapore, state or religious representatives do not engage in a “formal theological dialogue” with detainees; rather that task is left to “insiders” or former militants who have publically recanted their extremist ideologies and cooperated with authorities.<sup>lxxvi</sup> This is because the program, as such, is less focused on religious rehabilitation than the cultivation of intelligence for the disruption of further attacks and the arrest of more terrorists.<sup>lxxvii</sup> And in that regard it has been, and continues to be, successful in preventing JI’s activities in Southeast Asia.<sup>lxxviii</sup>

With little financial or administrative support from the government, police use a strategy of humane treatment to build trust between themselves and detainees, consulting with psychologists to fully immerse themselves in detainee culture, language and ideology.<sup>lxxix</sup> This “re-humanization” process is enough for some detainees to begin to reject extremism upon discovering the state is not their enemy.”<sup>lxxx</sup> Terrorist detainees are provided with better living conditions than most prisoners, are not under constant surveillance, and have available to them a

vast array of personal luxuries including, in some cases, cell phones.<sup>lxxxix</sup> They are also offered counseling services, though very few have elected to accept.<sup>lxxxii</sup> By raising funds through private donations, guards are able to provide limited assistance to family members, some of which is used for family visits.<sup>lxxxiii</sup> Police officials estimate that more than half of all detainees respond positively to treatment and increase their level of cooperation with authorities.<sup>lxxxiv</sup> And because there is no link between cooperation and release, we would expect only those detainees who sincerely felt compelled to cooperate would do so.<sup>lxxxv</sup> But there are reports of recidivism: in one case as many as 20 former detainees were rearrested in 2010 for a terror plot, having formed an extremist network among themselves after their release.<sup>lxxxvi</sup> Taking a broader approach, the government has also established youth de-radicalization programs, as well as interfaith dialogue workshops, “to turn the tide against rising trends of radicalism and religious intolerance.”<sup>lxxxvii</sup> In general, the Indonesia approach differs significantly – in both execution and aim – from Saudi Arabia’s, Iraq’s or Singapore’s. But this bottom-up strategy is successful because it is a reflection of Indonesia’s decentralized method in governing its diffuse island nation.<sup>lxxxviii</sup> Emulating their efforts, programs similar to those in Singapore and Indonesia have been established, with varying degrees of success, in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines.

## **A EUROPEAN APPROACH to SOFT COUNTER-TERRORISM**

Europe has a long history of dealing with extremists from across the political spectrum. This includes the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Spain’s *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA), the West German Red Army Faction (RAF), the Italian Red Brigades, and an array of single-issue groups, environmentalists, neo-Fascists, neo-Nazi, and racist organizations. But more recently, European

governments have had to also address the threat posed by radical Islam. This long history of dealing with the problem of terrorism on the continent has led to the creation of a distinctly European approach to preventing violent extremism and countering radicalization. It is heavily preventative in nature, less focused on prison rehabilitation, and makes use of local communities and civil society for the purposes of individual targeted interventions during the pre- or early radicalization stages.<sup>lxxxix</sup> For example, the *EXIT* program - pioneered by the Norwegian government and subsequently adopted by governments in Finland, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland - has had success disengaging and de-radicalizing right wing and racist individuals. These techniques are currently being used in an effort achieve the same results among their respective Muslims populations.<sup>xc</sup> More generally, broader European strategy consists of five components. These include mainstreaming and normalizing counter-terrorism within government and law enforcement; creating an extensive legal framework to confront violent extremism and terrorism as a criminal offense; stressing good communication between state officials and Muslim communities; creating assessment capabilities to analyze success and failure in counter-terrorism; and finally, focusing on a secular, rather than a theological approach to preventing violent extremism and countering radicalization.<sup>xc</sup>

Following the 2005 London bombings, the United Kingdom launched the *CONTEST* strategy, based on the 2003 *PREVENT* strategy. It consists of four components: Prevent (preventing terrorism by addressing the factors that produce radicalization); Pursue (pursuing terrorists and their sponsors); Protect (protecting the public and government); and Prepare (preparing for the consequences of a terrorist attack).<sup>xcii</sup> The strategy employs local police and government officials, as well as non-governmental organizations in order to, “challenge radical Islamism, disrupt those who promote violent extremism, support individuals who are vulnerable



to radicalization or who have begun to radicalize, increase the capacity of communities to resist violent extremism, and address grievances that violent extremists exploit.”<sup>xciii</sup> The British government empowers local groups to create prevention strategies suited for specific communities while simultaneously conducting in-depth research into attitudes, demographics, and media consumption to effectively target those most at risk.<sup>xciv</sup> In an effort to engender dialogue with Muslim communities, the government also sponsors Muslim outreach activities, campus debates and customized educational materials focusing on youths.<sup>xcv</sup> Officials pay special attention to combating Islamophobia in society by using non-inflammatory terminology in an effort to create a non-emotive lexicon when discussing violent extremism and radicalization.<sup>xcvi</sup> The British government also seeks to partner with ‘moderate’ Muslim organizations, recognizing their legitimacy and authority in combating radical Islam through the employment of the teaching of mainstream Islam.<sup>xcvii</sup> Secular governments naturally lack such capacities.<sup>xcviii</sup> As James Brandon notes, although it may be premature to evaluate the British government’s counter-radicalization efforts, “it is clear, however, that Muslim secularists are increasingly successful in finding ways to challenge jihadist ideologies.”<sup>xcix</sup> Finally, the British government pursues preventive strategies in prisons, by selecting and closely monitoring the behavior of prison *Imams* and requiring all Islamic materials, as well as sermons, to be delivered exclusively in English to ensure they are not radical in nature.<sup>c</sup>

The Netherlands has instituted one of the most “sophisticated” strategies to counter extremism and radicalization.<sup>ci</sup> After the 2004 assassination of Theo Van Gogh, local municipalities created customized counter-radicalization programs that were later compiled and presented by the Dutch government in its 2007 *Polarization and Radicalization Action Plan*.<sup>cii</sup> The basic strategy encourages a three-tiered approach, targeting the demand (for individuals

searching for answers from Islam), the supply (of radical ideology) and the breeding grounds (for radical Islamic beliefs).<sup>ciii</sup> One of the most widely emulated programs, from the city of Amsterdam, is, “characterized by the cooperation of an intricate web of ministries, governmental agencies, local authorities, social services, educational facilities, think-tanks, religious institutions and freelance consultants. Openness, information sharing and constant input from all possible sources seem to be the guiding principles.”<sup>civ</sup> By increasing societal trust, political confidence, religious defensibility and reaching out the at-risk youth, the program employs a more flexible approach, using “repressive measures” only when an individual is not deemed “savable” by authorities, and are instead considered “doers” (i.e. are capable of, or have engaged in, acts of violent extremism).<sup>cv</sup> The Dutch focus heavily on empowering individuals through interventionist strategies, improving the welfare of Muslim communities, and cultivating multi-faith initiatives to combat Islamophobia in society in order to maintain social cohesion.<sup>cvi</sup> In so doing, the program maintains a heavy focus on the promotion of Muslim integration strategies.<sup>cvi</sup> Programs similar to those in the U.K. and the Netherlands have been instituted in Denmark and outside of the continent in Australia and Canada.<sup>cviii</sup> Empowering local communities to customize programs has resulted in such innovative concepts as a 12 step “Specialized De-Radicalization Intervention Program” to provide guidance for those at risk in Toronto, and the participation of police liaisons in local sporting events and employment camps for teens in Sydney and Melbourne.<sup>cix</sup>

## **A COLLECTIVE APPROACH to SOFT COUNTER-TERRORISM**

The government does not always initiate de-radicalization programs.<sup>cx</sup> Lessons regarding the role of the Egyptian and Algerian authorities in collective de-radicalization during the 1990s illustrate

the part that governments can play as a facilitator rather than as an instigator in successfully preventing violent extremism and countering radicalization. Collective de-radicalization, or “spontaneous de-radicalization,” occurs internally, but when it is supported by the government, the process can be further developed, and the outcome used to combat the spread of radicalization through the community.<sup>cxii</sup> Although collective radicalization typically begins with the perception of defeat by the organization’s senior leadership - following a period of state repression, imprisonment and/or execution - Ashour notes that a coupling of social interactions with moderate activists and former extremists, in addition to selective inducements by the state (including pardons, amnesties, sentence reductions and the dropping of charges), can ensure a process of collective de-radicalization is set in motion and that it spreads across an organization’s ranks.<sup>cxiii</sup> Group recantations often prove more powerful in the absence of an institutionalized government program, making the de-radicalization process appear natural, thereby making the group’s rejection of violence more attractive to the larger community. In promoting a rejection of violence within society, organizational support for extremist movements is lost, and the potential for recruitment is diminished.<sup>cxiiii</sup>

As Ashour writes, though “eliminating the ‘spiritual’ leaders of a militant movement could be perceived as a media/psychological victory for a government,” it actually makes, “a comprehensive de-radicalization process less likely to succeed. Those leaders are necessary to legitimize de-radicalization and initiate a genuine dialogue with their followers.”<sup>cxv</sup> Many of the same factors that were present in Egypt and Algeria, can be observed in Libya where the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) underwent a collective de-radicalization process during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.<sup>cxvi</sup> The same is true of non-Islamic terrorist organizations such as the IRA and ETA.<sup>cxvii</sup>

## **LESSONS LEARNED and APPLIED in the U.S. WAR on TERRORISM**

Before examining the best practices from the aforementioned programs, and their application to the U.S. fight against Islamic extremism, it is important to note, as Horgan and Tore Bjorgo write,

Terrorism is a phenomenon that manifests itself within specific political and social contexts. The factors that drive or facilitate disengagement for each group tend to be context-specific, movement-specific, and time-specific. Each programme [*sic*] is thus context-bound, and we ought to be cautious about over-generalizing from individual successes or failures. The strengths of particular disengagement programmes derive from their ability to meet the social needs of the ‘clients’ as well as being sensitive to their specific political and social contexts.<sup>cxvii</sup>

With that said, lessons learned from preventing violent extremism and countering radicalization programs are broadly applicable to United States’ effort to combat terrorism in both the short term and long term. These lessons are important; in a 2010 Bipartisan Policy Center report, the authors conclude that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan and Somalia have proven to be a serious threat, not only to American interests overseas, but also to the homeland through their increased capability to attack within the U.S. via the development of an, “embryonic terrorist recruitment, radicalization, and operational infrastructure.”<sup>cxviii</sup> The more than 50 domestic terrorist plots foiled since 2001 only serve to further emphasize this fact.<sup>cxix</sup>

The most important lesson learned is prison rehabilitation efforts have proven successful when properly executed. As Peter Neumann writes, no de-radicalization program is perfect but, what they illustrate is that prisons, “can make a positive contribution to tackling problems of

radicalisation [*sic*] and terrorism in society as a whole: the positive and outward-looking approach that is exhibited in several of these programmes should serve as an inspiration for policymakers and prison authorities all over the world.”<sup>cxx</sup> Borrowing from Anne Speckhard, we can see that the best programs to prevent violent extremism and counter radicalization consist of a series of features. These include, a civil rapport between prisoner and cleric, psychologist or team; religious rehabilitation with an emphasis on challenging radical Islamic beliefs and engaging in faith-based critical thinking; psychological and medical treatment; family and/or tribal involvement; economic inducements and incentives for participation; skills training, including education and vocational opportunities, as well as recreational programs (including sports, art and music); isolation from ‘hardcore’ or non-rehabilitative militants; weekly or daily counseling sessions; post-release care; a commitment to human rights throughout rehabilitation process; and finally, a systematic means for assessing the efficiency of the program.<sup>cxxi</sup> Because radicalization is a process of socialization into a terrorist organization, an equally comprehensive program of socialization out of terrorism is a critical element in prison-based rehabilitation programs. The U.S. would benefit from using these elements in its Guantanamo Bay detention facility, where currently no institutionalized program is in place.<sup>cxxii</sup> Establishing a program, without the promise of release upon completion, might yield positive results, including improved intelligence collection – as was seen in Indonesia – or the potential of eventual repatriation for those terrorist suspects deemed thoroughly rehabilitated. And for those detainees who are released, the U.S. must maintain a reasonable expectation of recidivism.<sup>cxxiii</sup> As former homeland security advisor Frances Townsend remarked, “we shouldn’t expect them to be any more successful than our rehabilitation efforts in U.S. prisons. And we ought to be mindful that at least if they’re making the effort and taking somebody off the field, that’s a good thing.”<sup>cxxiv</sup>

Prison rehabilitation efforts in Guantanamo Bay should also serve as a reminder that prisons at home and overseas are a cause for concern. Although just over 350 terrorists are incarcerated in U.S. prisons, that does not imply the prison system is immune to the threat.<sup>cxxv</sup> With over 35,000 terrorism convictions across the world since 2001, the potential for extremism to flourish behind bars in any country cannot be understated.<sup>cxxvi</sup> The U.S. must work at home and overseas to make sure prison officials and local governments are not only aware of the problems prisons can create, but are actively adhering to at least some, if not all, of Speckhard's features, and at a bare minimum, separating radicalized from non-radicalized detainees. As Stone writes, "there must be international coordination to develop programmes that reduce the risk of religious radicalization," suggesting a "global counsel" that might advise government on the reduction of threat, provide services and assist in the securing of international funding.<sup>cxxvii</sup> This job might be filled by the United Nations' Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, which has already begun to address the matter.<sup>cxxviii</sup> But while global coordination is often difficult, in the meantime, there is much the U.S. can do to assist nations in their efforts to counter violent extremism and prevent radicalization. The U.S. must pursue these types of strategies overseas, particularly in Africa - the most recent front on the War on Terrorism, in Yemen - where new leadership will most certainly be receptive to increased American support against al Qaeda's efforts to usurp its newly established authority, and in Pakistan - which continues to be a breeding ground for extremist activities, and which has recently instituted a de-radicalization and targeted intervention program.<sup>cxxix</sup> The U.S. must also ensure its transatlantic partners are dedicated to fighting violent extremism and radicalization, as easy passage between the European Union and the U.S. ensures European radicalization is as much a problem for Americans as it is Europeans.<sup>cxxx</sup>

The U.S. must also focus on, and encourage the use of, preventative efforts to ensure individuals are not radicalized in the first place, both at home and overseas. As Bjorgo and Horgan reminds us, “disrupting the process of violent radicalization early in a terrorist career is far better than attempting to do so after someone has committed serious crimes and caused suffering.”<sup>cxxxix</sup> Drawing from the case studies presented in this research, we know what works. This includes empowering local communities to customize solutions and engage in community policing; targeting specific groups with relevant information (for example, immigrant or native-born Muslims as distinct from converts to Islam) with a specific focus on reaching out to the younger generations (particularly individuals under the age of 30); making Muslim communities aware of the state’s commitment to democratic participation, justice and equality; publicizing efforts to combat Islamophobia; and creating effective channels for communication between state and local authorities, religious institutions, schools, recreational associations, parents and mentors so that interventionist strategies might be employed as a preventative measure.<sup>cxxxii</sup> Strategies to counter the extremist message – in schools, community centers, mosques, recreational associations, and especially online – must be undertaken by partnering with a wide variety of experts and credible Muslim messengers, all of who promote a moderate Islamic message that seeks to de-glamorize or de-mystify terrorism.<sup>cxxxiii</sup> Although choosing Muslim partners is always problematic – concerns include sanctioning one type of Islam over another through the very act of selecting a partner, choosing groups who later prove to be less moderate than expected, and reconciling the institutionalized separation of church and state in the democratic world – governments should keep in mind that, “the idea is not to regard Islamists as providing an alternative mass movement to *jihadism* [*sic*]. Rather, the division of labor that falls to Islamist-linked groups within Muslim public space in the West has more to do with framing

issues and organizing events where these concerns are discussed and debated.”<sup>cxv</sup>

As the Foreign Minister of Norway recently penned in the *New York Times*, “political extremism does not grow in a vacuum. Ideas are the oxygen that allows it to flourish and spread. Extremist perspectives win sympathy and recruits because they offer narratives that claim to identify deep injustices and enemies. Without this fuel, the blaze of extremism is quickly extinguished.”<sup>cxvi</sup> This is why a practical emphasis on countering the radical narrative of terrorist organizations is the most crucial element in any program to prevent violent extremism and counter radicalization. The U.S. has already begun to implement a Saudi style *al Sakinah* campaign to undermine extremists online. As Spencer Ackerman reported in July 2012, the State Department’s “strategic trolling” program known as *Viral Peace*, “seeks to occupy the virtual space that extremists fill, one thread or Twitter exchange at a time.”<sup>cxvii</sup> The operation aims to use, “logic, humor, satire, [and] religious arguments, not just to confront [extremists], but to undermine and demoralize them.”<sup>cxviii</sup> Empowering young, social media savvy Muslims from around the world, equipped with an Internet connection and a basic curriculum, the State Department hopes to subvert online extremism by using the very pool of able-bodied men and women said extremists aim to recruit.<sup>cxix</sup> This program deserves top priority status and increased funding.

As for the long term, there is little more the U.S. can do than continue to promote a commitment to democratization, human rights and economic development. As noted in the *Journal of National Security Law & Policy*, “political and economic reform in the Middle East remains the best strategic response to overcoming the region’s deep structural challenges and reducing the pool of potential recruits to radical extremism.”<sup>cx</sup> The revolutions currently engulfing the Middle East and North Africa remain America’s best hope to pursue this policy,



though without strong leadership and a clear strategy for supporting the right partners in the Arab world, the opportunity will be lost to those on the ground – including extremist elements who seek to usurp the revolutionary-democratic fervor of the protestors in the street. Finally, the U.S. must commit to supporting further research in the field of de-radicalization and disengagement. One promising avenue involves “terrorist dropouts” or individuals who elect to disengage from terrorism voluntarily.<sup>cxl</sup> Examining the reasons and process behind the choice to leave a terrorist organization might enable American authorities to create conditions conducive to making this decision a more accessible reality at home and overseas. Lorenzo Vidino sums it up best in his presentation of 10 lessons learned from his research into counter-radicalization programs: know your client, be flexible, set clear metrics, choose many partners, work at the local level, play down counterterrorism, be open (to anyone with expertise), find ways to evaluate success and failure and finally, have a thick skin – counter-radicalization is no easy task.<sup>cxli</sup>

It has become obvious to those nations confronting violent extremism and radicalization that soft counter-terrorism policies are an integral part of the War on Terrorism, for as Admiral Michael Mullen reminds us, “we can’t kill our way to victory.”<sup>cxlii</sup> But these programs are not a panacea, not should they be thought of as such.<sup>cxliii</sup> The real question countries facing the threat of violent extremism and radicalization should ask themselves is, how can the government be used to affect positive societal change so that individuals do not feel it incumbent upon themselves to take matters into their own hands and affect negative societal change?<sup>cxliv</sup> By downplaying the focus on who holds the moral high ground in this struggle, much can be gained in the fight. Confronting terrorism as a practical problem with practical solutions, and not allowing it to strangle society through fear and the suspension of liberties, is the only way forward. America has fought and defeated many great enemies throughout its history – terrorism

will be no different.

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<sup>i</sup> Townsend, Frances, “Deradicalization’: Oasis or Mirage?,” (Global Security Forum 2011, Washington, D.C., June, 8, 2011), accessed July 1, 2012, <http://csis.org/event/global-security-forum-2011-deradicalization-oasis-or-mirage>.

<sup>ii</sup> For the purposes of this research, we define ‘radical’ as the, “possession of extremist views and a willingness to use violence in the pursuit of extremist, racist, or political objectives.” Fink, Naureen Chowdhury and Hearne, Ellie B., *Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism*, (New York: International Peace Institute: 2008), p. i. For the purposes of this research ‘Islamic’ terrorism refers to a distinct branch of Salafism, as practiced by al Qaeda, its affiliates and aspirants, and not to Islam as a religion.

<sup>iii</sup> Gunaratna, Rohan, “Example Cases and Programs: Battlefield of the Mind: Terrorist Rehabilitation,” in *Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization and Disengagement*, eds. Laurie Fentsermacher, Larry Kuznar, Tom Reiger and Anne Speckhard, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government, 2010), 364.

<sup>iv</sup> For example, in 2009 the Saudi government released a list of its 85 most wanted terrorist suspects. Among them were seven men who, after having left the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, went through an extensive rehabilitation program in Saudi Arabia, and upon their release, returned to terrorism in Yemen. Some of these men were identified as senior ranking members of al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Similar problems occurred in Yemen, leading to the dismantling of that country’s prison-based religious rehabilitation program. See Bennett, Brian, “U.S. concerned about former Guantanamo prisoners in Yemen,” *Los Angeles*

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*Times*, November 2, 2010, and Boucek, Christopher and Johnsen, Gregory D., “The Dilemma of the Yemeni Detainees at Guantanamo Bay,” *CTC Sentinel*, 1 (2008), 2.

<sup>v</sup> Cronin, Audrey Kurth, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

<sup>vi</sup> Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*.

<sup>vii</sup> Hearne, Ellie B. and Laiq, Nur. *A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism*, (New York: International Peace Institute, 2010), 3.

<sup>viii</sup> As Jessica Stern notes, soft counter-terrorism tactics, “should look more like anti-gang programs and public diplomacy than war.” See Stern, Jessica. “Mind Over Martyr,” *Foreign Affairs*, 89 (2010), 108. Also see Hearne and Laiq. *A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism*, 3.

<sup>ix</sup> Ramakrishna, Kumar, “The Four Mutations of Violent Muslim Extremism in Southeast Asia: Some Implications for a Cognitive Immunization Policy,” *Asia Policy*, 12 (2011): 13-19 and Rosenau, William, “Waging the “War of Ideas,”” in *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook: The Definitive Guide for Law Enforcement, EMT, and all other Security Professionals*, ed. David Kamien, (New York, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2006), 1131-1148.

<sup>x</sup> The author found references to counter-radicalization and de-radicalization efforts in Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia (Chechnya), Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,

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Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of American and Yemen. These undertakings include efforts to counter right and left wing ethno-nationalist and insurgent, as well as narco- and religious-based, violent extremism and radicalization.

<sup>xi</sup> Schmid, Alex P., “The Definition of Terrorism” in *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, ed. Alex P. Schmid, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 39, 86.

<sup>xii</sup> Schmid, “The Definition of Terrorism,” 86.

<sup>xiii</sup> Schmid, “The Definition of Terrorism,” 86.

<sup>xiv</sup> Schmid, “The Definition of Terrorism,” 86-87.

<sup>xv</sup> Schmid, “The Definition of Terrorism,” 87.

<sup>xvi</sup> Hacker, Frederick, *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazyies: Terror and Terrorism in our Time*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976).

<sup>xvii</sup> Hearne and Nur. *A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism*, 2.

<sup>xviii</sup> Ashour, Omar, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements*, (London: Routledge, 2009), 5.

<sup>xix</sup> Vidino, Lorenzo, *Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Peace Institute, 2010), 4.

<sup>xx</sup> Vidino, Lorenzo, *Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe*, 4.

<sup>xxi</sup> Bjorgo, Tore and Horgan John, “Introduction,” in *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, eds. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 5.

<sup>xxii</sup> United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1373: On threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts*, (New York: United Nations, 2001).

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<sup>xxiii</sup> El-Said, Hamed, *De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States*, (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2012), 1 and Fishman, Shira and Kruglanski, Arie W. “Psychological Factors in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Individual, Group, and Organizational Levels of Analysis,” *Social Issues and Policy Review*, 3 (2009): 33.

<sup>xxiv</sup> Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, *First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes*. (New York: United Nations, June 2010), 5.

<sup>xxv</sup> Horgan, John, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 153.

<sup>xxvi</sup> Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, *First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes*, 5.

<sup>xxvii</sup> Rascoff, Samuel J., “Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization,” *Stanford Law Review*, 64 (2012): 138-145.

<sup>xxviii</sup> Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*, 159.

<sup>xxix</sup> Furthermore Horgan posits that though they might be disengaged, no terrorist is ever truly de-radicalized. Horgan, John. “Individual Disengagement: A psychological analysis,” in *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, eds. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 27 and Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*, 27.

<sup>xxx</sup> Bjorgo and Horgan, “Introduction,” 4.

<sup>xxxi</sup> Silke, Andrew, “Disengagement or Deradicalization: A Look at Prison Programs for Jailed

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Terrorists,” *CTC Sentinel*, 4 (2011): 20.

<sup>xxxii</sup> On precedence see Bjorgo and Horgan, “Introduction,” 5; Clutterbuck, Lindsay et al., *Individual disengagement from Al Qa’ida-influenced terrorist groups: A Rapid Evidence Assessment to inform policy and practice in preventing terrorism*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2011), vii-ix; 21-45; Gunaratna, Rohan and Rubin, Lawrence, “Introduction” in *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-Terrorism* eds. Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin, (London: Routledge, 2011), 3-4; LaFree, Gary and Miller, Erin, “Desistance from Terrorism: What can we learn from Criminology?” *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism*, 1 (2009): 203-230; and Morris, Madeline, *Deradicalization: A Review of the Literature with Comparison to Findings in the Literatures on Degang and Deprogramming*, (Durham: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010), 6-7. On de-Nazification see Voigtländer, Nico and Voth, Hans-Joachim *Hatred transformed: How Germans changed their minds about Jews, 1890-2006*, (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2012).

<sup>xxxiii</sup> Boucek, Christopher et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), 34-35.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> Horgan, John and Braddock, Kurt. “Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22 (2010): 268.

<sup>xxxv</sup> Fishman and Kruglanski, “Psychological Factors in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Individual, Group, and Organizational Levels of Analysis,” 28.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> Ansary, Abdullah F., “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” *Middle East Policy*, 15 (2012): 118; Boucek, Christopher. *Saudi Arabia’s “Soft”*

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*Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 4 and Stracke, Nicole, “Arab Prisons: A Place for Dialog and Reform,” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, (1) 2007: 7.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 118 and Boucek, *Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, 5.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 118 and Boucek, *Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, 11.

<sup>xxxix</sup> Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 119.

<sup>xl</sup> Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 119 and Boucek, *Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, 12, 19.

<sup>xli</sup> Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 120.

<sup>xlii</sup> Boucek, *Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, 13, 17-18.

<sup>xliii</sup> Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 120 and Boucek, *Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, 19-21.

<sup>xliv</sup> It is important to note that completion of the counseling program is not a guarantee that a detainee will be released. See Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 120-121 and Boucek, *Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, 21-22.

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<sup>xlv</sup> Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 121 and Boucek, *Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, 21.

<sup>xlvi</sup> Boucek, *Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, 21.

<sup>xlvii</sup> Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 126-127 and Boucek, *Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, 8-10, 13-14.

<sup>xlviii</sup> Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 125.

<sup>xlix</sup> Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 121-123; Boucek, Christopher, “The *Sakinah* Campaign and Internet Counter-Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” *CTC Sentinel*, 1 (2008): 1-4; and Figchel, Jonathan, *The Saudi Double-Game: The Internet “Counter-Radicalization” Campaign in Saudi Arabia*, (Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2009). For more on the dynamics of online radicalization, see Brachman, Jarret M and Levine, Alix N. “You Too Can Be Awlaki!”, *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 35 (2011): 25-46; Cilluffo, Frank et al., *NETworked Radicalization: A Counter-Strategy*, (Washington, D.C.: Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2009); Committee on Homeland and Governmental Affairs, *Zachary Chesser: A Case Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and Its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate, 2012); Gohel, Sajjan M., “The Internet and its Role in Terrorist Recruitment and Operational Planning,” *CTC Sentinel*, 2 (2009): 12-15; Neumann, Peter R. and Stevens Tim, *Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action*, (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2009); and Rogan, Hanna, *Jihadism Online: A Study of*



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*How al-Qaida and Radical Islamist Groups Use the Internet for Terrorist Purposes*, (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2006).

<sup>l</sup> Boucek, Christopher, “The Sakinah Campaign and Internet Counter-Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” *CTC Sentinel*, 1 (2008): 3.

<sup>li</sup> Ansary, “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 121-123 and Boucek, “The Sakinah Campaign and Internet Counter-Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” 2-3.

<sup>lii</sup> Abdullah Ansary notes that, “al Qaeda issued several statements over the Internet cautioning their followers not to engage in dialogues with members of the Tranquility Campaign, an indication that it is having a positive impact.” See Ansary “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 121-123 and Boucek, “The Sakinah Campaign and Internet Counter-Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” 2-3.

<sup>liii</sup> Ansary reports the program is increasingly focusing on women, who, according to the Saudi government, operate more than half of all extremist websites. See Ansary “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 122-123.

<sup>liv</sup> The website can be accessed at <http://www.assakina.com>. See Ansary “Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach,” 124-125 and Boucek, “The Sakinah Campaign and Internet Counter-Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” 3-4.

<sup>lv</sup> Boucek, Christopher. “Deradicalization’: Oasis or Mirage?,” (Global Security Forum 2011, Washington, D.C., June, 8, 2011), accessed July 1, 2012, <http://csis.org/event/global-security-forum-2011-deradicalization-oasis-or-mirage>.

<sup>lvi</sup> Angell, Ami and Gunaratna, Rohan, *Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq*, (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2012).

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<sup>lvii</sup> A smaller program was also instituted at Camp Cropper. See Keyser, Jason, “Camp Bucca: Military Closes Largest Detention Camp In Iraq,” *The Associated Press*, September 16, 2009; Miller, Judith, “What I Learned At 'Anti-Jihad U,’” *The New York Post*, May 2, 2008; and Speckhard, Anne “Prison and Community Based Disengagement and De-Radicalization Programs for Extremists Involved in Militant Jihadi Terrorism Ideologies and Activities,” in *Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization and Disengagement*, eds. Laurie Fentsermacher, Larry Kuznar, Tom Reiger and Anne Speckhard, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government, 2010), 355-356.

<sup>lviii</sup> Speckhard, “Prison and Community Based Disengagement and De-Radicalization Programs for Extremists Involved in Militant Jihadi Terrorism Ideologies and Activities,” 356.

<sup>lix</sup> Speckhard, “Prison and Community Based Disengagement and De-Radicalization Programs for Extremists Involved in Militant Jihadi Terrorism Ideologies and Activities,” 355.

<sup>lx</sup> Speckhard, “Prison and Community Based Disengagement and De-Radicalization Programs for Extremists Involved in Militant Jihadi Terrorism Ideologies and Activities,” 355.

<sup>lxi</sup> Angell and Rohan, *Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq*, 351-358.

<sup>lxii</sup> Angell and Rohan, *Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq*, 179.

<sup>lxiii</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 79 and Speckhard, “Prison and Community Based Disengagement and De-Radicalization Programs for Extremists Involved in Militant Jihadi Terrorism Ideologies and Activities,” 357.

<sup>lxiv</sup> Stone, Douglas, “Deradicalization’: Oasis or Mirage?,” (Global Security Forum 2011, Washington, D.C., June, 8, 2011), accessed, July 1, 2012, <http://csis.org/event/global-security-forum-2011-deradicalization-oasis-or-mirage>.

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<sup>lxv</sup> Boucek and Johnsen, “The Dilemma of the Yemeni Detainees at Guantanamo Bay,” 2.

<sup>lxvi</sup> Chowdhury, Naureen and El-Said, Hamed, *Transforming Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism*, (New York: International Peace Institute, 2011), 9 and El-Said, Hamed, *De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States*, 23-24.

<sup>lxvii</sup> Dobson, William J. “The Best Guide for Gitmo? Look to Singapore,” *Washington Post*, May 17, 2009; Gunaratna, Rohan and Hassan, Mohamed Feisal bin Mohamed “Terrorist Rehabilitation: The Singapore Experience” in *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-Terrorism* eds. Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin, (London: Routledge, 2011), 36-58; Hassan, Muhammad Haniff. “Singapore’s Muslim Community-Based Initiatives against JI,” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 1 (2007): 3-8; Ramakrishna, Kumar, “A Holistic Critique of Singapore’s Counter-Ideological Program,” *CTC Sentinel*, 2 (2009): 8-11; and Yuit, Gavin Chua Hearn, “Singapore’s Approach to Counterterrorism,” *CTC Sentinel*, 2 (2009): 21-24.

<sup>lxviii</sup> Yuit, “Singapore’s Approach to Counterterrorism,” 21.

<sup>lxix</sup> “About RRG,” Religious Rehabilitation Group, accessed July 9, 2012, [http://rrg.sg/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=2](http://rrg.sg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=2); Abuza, Zachary, “The rehabilitation of *Jemaah Islamiyah* detainees in South East Asia: A preliminary assessment,” in *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, eds. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 202; Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 98-99; Hassan, “Singapore’s Muslim Community-Based Initiatives against JI,” 4-5; Ramakrishna, “A Holistic Critique of Singapore’s Counter-Ideological Program,” 10; and Yuit, “Singapore’s Approach to Counterterrorism,” 21.

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<sup>lxx</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 99-100 and Hassan, “Singapore’s Muslim Community-Based Initiatives against JI,” 5.

<sup>lxxi</sup> Although post-release care is optional, detainees on restriction orders are required to continue attending religious counseling. Making the community responsible only works, according to Boucek et al., because of the well-ordered and disciplined nature of Singapore’s society. See Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 100-102, 104 and Hearne and Laiq. *A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism*, 9-10.

<sup>lxxii</sup> Abuza, “The rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah detainees in South East Asia: A preliminary assessment,” 202; Hassan, Muhammad Haniff. “Singapore’s Muslim Community-Based Initiatives against JI,” 5-8 and Ramakrishna, “A Holistic Critique of Singapore’s Counter-Ideological Program,” 10.

<sup>lxxiii</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 104 and Ramakrishna, “A Holistic Critique of Singapore’s Counter-Ideological Program,” 10.

<sup>lxxiv</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 103 and “Singapore Scheme Helps De-Radicalise Detainees in Iraq,” *Malaysian Insider*, April 20, 2009.

<sup>lxxv</sup> Speckhard, “Prison and Community Based Disengagement and De-Radicalization Programs for Extremists Involved in Militant Jihadi Terrorism Ideologies and Activities,” 353.

<sup>lxxvi</sup> Attempts by Indonesian authorities to create and administer formal lectures and other educational material on Islam for detainees failed to gain traction and was abandoned in 2005. Analysts credit a lack of comprehensive knowledge regarding the radical ideology the state was attempting to counter. Amin, Ali, Rphmaniyah, Inayah and Woodward, Mark, *Lessons from Aceh Terrorist De-Radicalization*, (Phoenix: Consortium for Strategic Communication, 2010), 7; Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 107, 110-114; *Deradicalisation and Indonesia*

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*Prisons*, (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2007), 11-12; and “The Bali jihadist now on a peace mission,” *BBC News*, March 14, 2008, accessed July 1, 2012,

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7296934.stm>.

<sup>lxxvii</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 107.

<sup>lxxviii</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 107.

<sup>lxxix</sup> Amin, Rphmaniyah, and Woodward, *Lessons from Aceh Terrorist De-Radicalization*, 3 and Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 107-108.

<sup>lxxx</sup> Amin, Rphmaniyah, and Woodward, *Lessons from Aceh Terrorist De-Radicalization*, 5.

<sup>lxxxii</sup> Amin, Rphmaniyah, and Woodward, *Lessons from Aceh Terrorist De-Radicalization*, 4.

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> The government reports only 20 out of approximately 400 detainees have sought counseling. See Abuza, “The rehabilitation of *Jemaah Islamiyah* detainees in South East Asia: A preliminary assessment,” 200.

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> Amin, Rphmaniyah, and Woodward, *Lessons from Aceh Terrorist De-Radicalization*, 4 and Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 108.

<sup>lxxxv</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 108-109, 115.

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 110.

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 115.

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> Rainstorm, Magnus, *Preventing Violent Radicalization and Terrorism: The Case of Indonesia*, (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2009), 9-10 and “Small steps mark big fight against growing radicalism,” *The Jakarta Post*, June 25, 2012.

<sup>lxxxix</sup> It is important to note that the Indonesian’s decentralized approach also has its drawbacks. Without engaging in religious dialogue, and by allowing prisoners to control the religious discourse, there is an increased potential for radicalization by detainees of detainees and prisons

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staff. The lack of financial support by the government makes the program more difficult to administer, creates an uneven disruption of incentives, and has resulted widespread corruption. Amin, Rphmaniyah, and Woodward, *Lessons from Aceh Terrorist De-Radicalization*, 6, 13; Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 114-116; Demant, Froukje et al., *Decline and Disengagement: An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation* (Amsterdam: Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, 2008), 173; and Hassan, Muhammad Haniff and Yasin, Nur Azlin Mohamed, “Indonesian Prisons: A Think Tank for Terrorists,” *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, 4 (2012): 10-15.

<sup>lxxxix</sup> According to the British government, 1,500 interventions or “empowerment conversations” have been staged with no arrests following. Danish, Dutch and Norwegian authorities claim similarly high success rates. See Brandon, James and Vidino, Lorenzo, “European Experiences in Counterradicalization,” *CTC Sentinel*, 5 (2012): 17-18.

<sup>xc</sup> Bjorgo, Tore, “Reducing Recruitment and Promotion Disengagement from Extremist Groups: The Case of racist Sub-Cultures,” in *A Future for the Young: Options for helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization*, ed. Cheryl Benard, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005) and Bjorgo, Tore, Grunenber, Sara and Van Jaap, Donelaar, “Exit from right-wing extremist groups: Lessons from disengagement programmes in Norway, Sweden and Germany,” in *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, eds. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 135-151.

<sup>xcii</sup> Bogaerts, Stefan et al., *First inventory of policy on counterterrorism: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States - ‘research in progress,’* (The Hague: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, 2006) and Brandon and Vidino, “European Experiences in Counterradicalization,” 18.

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<sup>xcii</sup> In 2009, the British government launched *CONTEST-2*, a revised version of *CONTEST*, with a greater emphasis on proactive and preventive measures. Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 124; Brandon and Vidino, “European Experiences in Counterradicalization,” 17 ; HM Government, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, (London, 2011); and Pantucci, Raffaello. “A contest to democracy? How the UK has responded to the current terrorist threat,” *Democratization*, 17 (2010): 25-271.

<sup>xciii</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 124.

<sup>xciv</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 126-128.

<sup>xcv</sup> European Commission, *Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy* (Brussels, 2008): 73.

<sup>xcvi</sup> European Commission, *Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy*, 74-75.

<sup>xcvii</sup> One popular example of a ‘moderate’ Muslim group is the British-based Quilliam Foundation, established and run by two former Islamic extremists. For more information, see <http://www.quilliamfoundaton.org>. Also see Benard, Cheryl et al., *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007) and Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 128-136.

<sup>xcviii</sup> Benard, et al., *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*, 128-136.

<sup>xcix</sup> Brandon, James, “The UK’s Experience in Counter-Radicalization,” *CTC Sentinel*, 1 (2008): 11.

<sup>c</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 138.

<sup>ci</sup> Vidino, Lorenzo, “A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-Radicalization in the Netherlands,” *CTC Sentinel*, 1 (2008): 12.

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<sup>cii</sup> Brandon and Vidino, “European Experiences in Counterradicalization,” 17.

<sup>ciii</sup> Mellis, Colin, “Amsterdam and radicalisation: the municipal approach,” in *Radicalisation in broader Perspective*, (Amsterdam: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2007): 40-48.

<sup>civ</sup> Vidino, “A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-Radicalization in the Netherlands,” 12.

<sup>cv</sup> European Commission, *Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy* (Brussels, 2008) 77; Vidino, “A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-Radicalization in the Netherlands,” 12; and Zannoni, Marco, *Amsterdam against radicalisation*, (Amsterdam: Municipality of Amsterdam, 2007): 9.

<sup>cvi</sup> Brandon and Vidino write, “carefully planned one-on-one interventions targeting well identified individuals... is a striking contrast with the United States, where individuals believed to be potentially at risk of radicalization may instead be viewed by police as potential targets for ‘agent provocateur’ schemes.” See Brandon, James and Vidino, Lorenzo, “European Experiences in Counterradicalization,” 18. Also see Vidino, “A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-Radicalization in the Netherlands,” 12-13.

<sup>cvii</sup> Meines, Marije, “Radicalisation and its prevention from the Dutch perspective” in *Radicalisation in Broader Perspective*, (Amsterdam: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2007): 36-38.

<sup>cviii</sup> On Denmark see, Government of Denmark, *Common and Safe Future: An action plan to prevent extremists views and radicalisation among young people*, (Copenhagen: 2009) and Lindekilde, Lasse “Neo-liberal Governing of “Radicals”: Danish Radicalization Prevention Policies and Potential Iatrogenic Effects,” *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 6 (2012): 109-125. On Australia see Lentini, Pete et al., *Counter-Terrorism Policing and Culturally Diverse Communities*, (Victoria: Monash University, 2007) and “Terrorists to be ‘de-



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radicalised' in NSW Supermax," *ABC News Australia*, February 25, 2010. On Canada see Ellis, James and Parents, Richard, *Countering Radicalization of Diaspora Communities in Canada*, (Vancouver: Metropolis British Columbia, 2011).

<sup>cix</sup> Foster, Kathleen, "Canadian Mosque Sets Up 'Detox' Program for Would-Be Terrorists," *Fox News*, February 26, 2009 and Neighbour, Sally, "Battle of ideas to curb terror," *The Australian*, November 2, 2010.

<sup>cx</sup> Ashour, Omar, "Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures," (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Policy Institute, 2008); Ashour, Omar. "Lions tamed? An inquiry into the causes of de-radicalization of armed Islamist movements: The case of the Egyptian Islamic Group," *The Middle East Journal*, 61 (2007): 596-625; Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements*, 90-135; Bin Ali, Mohamed and Gunaratna, Rohan "De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary Insight," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32 (2009): 277-291; Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 157-177; El-Said, *De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States*, 7-19; Rashwan, Diaan, "The renunciation of violence by Egyptian jihadi organizations," in *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, eds. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009): 113-131; and Rubin, Lawrence. "Non-kinetic approaches to counter-terrorism: a case study of Egypt and the Islamic Group," in *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-Terrorism* eds. Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin, (London: Routledge, 2011): 26-35.

<sup>cx</sup> El-Said, *De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States*, 17.

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<sup>cxii</sup> Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements*, 91-127; El-Said, *De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States*, 8; and Rashwan, Diao, “The renunciation of violence by Egyptian jihadi organizations,” 121, 124.

<sup>cxiii</sup> Bin Ali, and Gunaratna, “De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary Insight,” 288.

<sup>cxiv</sup> Ashour, Omar, “De-Radicalization of Jihad? The Impact of Egyptian Islamist Revisionists on Al-Qaeda,” *Perspective on Terrorism*, 2 (2008): 13.

<sup>cxv</sup> Boucek, et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 84-88, 163-164.

<sup>cxvi</sup> Alonso, Rogelio, “Leaving terrorism behind in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: reassessing anti-terrorists policies and the ‘peace process,’” in *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, eds. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009): 95; Horgan and Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs,” 269-271; and Reinares, Fernando, “Exit From Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study on Disengagement and Deradicalization Among Members of ETA,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23 (2011): 780-803.

<sup>cxvii</sup> Bjorgo, Tore and Horgan, John, “Conclusions,” in *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, eds. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009): 249.

<sup>cxviii</sup> Bergen, Peter and Hoffman, Bruce, *Assessing the Terrorist Threat*, (Washington, D.C.: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010): 3-13.

<sup>cxix</sup> Bucci, Steven, Carafano, James Jay and Zuckerman, Jessica, *Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11*, (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2012).

<sup>cxx</sup> Neumann, Peter R., *Prisons and Terrorism Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15*

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*Countries*, (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2010): 8.

<sup>cxxi</sup> Ami Angell and Rohan Gunaratna provide similar suggestions. Richard Barrett and Laila Bohari would add, “repentant terrorists taking an active part” to this list. See Angell and Rohan, *Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq*, 359-365; Barrett, Richard and Bohari, Laila, “Deradicalization and rehabilitation programmes targeting religious terrorists and extremists in the Muslim world: An overview,” in *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, eds. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 173 and Speckhard, “Prison and Community Based Disengagement and De-Radicalization Programs for Extremists Involved in Militant Jihadi Terrorism Ideologies and Activities,” 358.

<sup>cxxii</sup> Boucek, Christopher, “Losing on the Battlefield of the Mind,” *New York Times*, December 4, 2008.

<sup>cxxiii</sup> Stone notes that success is measured not only by recidivism, but also by a reduction in recruitment, both of which present comparable challenges in regards to data acquisition. See Stone, “Deradicalization’: Oasis or Mirage?”

<sup>cxxiv</sup> Townsend, “Deradicalization’: Oasis or Mirage?”

<sup>cxxv</sup> “359 Terrorists Currently in US Federal Prisons,” *ABC News*, December 15, 2009. On prison radicalization in the U.S. see, Central Intelligence Agency, *Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars*, (Langley, 2002); Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorists Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks*, (Washington, DC: United States Senate, 2006); and Hamm, Mark S., *Terrorists Recruitment in American*

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*Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups*, (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 2007).

<sup>cxxvi</sup> Mendoza, Martha, “Rightly or wrongly, thousands convicted of terrorism post-9/11,” *The Associated Press*, September 4, 2011.

<sup>cxxvii</sup> Stone, Douglas M. “Thinking Strategically About Terrorist Rehabilitation: Lesson from Iraq,” in *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-Terrorism* eds. Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin, (London: Routledge, 2011), 107.

<sup>cxxviii</sup> Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. *First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes*.

<sup>cxxix</sup> “Rehabilitating extremists,” *DAWN*, July 25, 2012, accessed: July 26, 2012, <http://dawn.com/2012/07/25/rehabilitating-extremists>.

<sup>cxxx</sup> For example, see “Norwegian trained by Al Qaeda offshoot in Yemen awaiting orders to attack West, European officials say,” *Associated Press*, June 25, 2012.

<sup>cxxxi</sup> Bjorgo and Horgan, “Conclusions,” 248.

<sup>cxxxii</sup> Paris, Jonathan, *Approaches to Anti-Radicalization and Community Policing in the Transatlantic Space*, (New York: Hudson Institute, 2007).

<sup>cxxxiii</sup> Bartlett, Jamie, Birdwell, Jonathan and King, Michael, *The Edge of Violence: A radical approach to extremism*, (London: Demos, 2010), 38-39 and Benard et al., *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*.

<sup>cxxxiv</sup> Mandaville, Peter, “Engaging Islamists in the West,” *CTC Sentinel*, 1 (2007): 5-7.

<sup>cxxxv</sup> Storer, Jonas Gahr, “Learning From Norway’s Tragedy,” *New York Times*, July 19, 2012.

<sup>cxxxvi</sup> Ackerman, Spencer, “Newest U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Trolling,” *Wired*, July 18,

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2012, accessed, July 19, 2012, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/counterterrorism-trolls>.

<sup>cxxxvii</sup> Ackerman, “Newest U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Trolling.”

<sup>cxxxviii</sup> Ackerman, “Newest U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Trolling.”

<sup>cxxxix</sup> Carpenter, J. Scott, Levitt, Matthew and Jacobson, Michael, “Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism,” *Journal of National Security Law & Policy*, 3 (2009): 315.

<sup>cxl</sup> Clutterbuck et al., *Individual disengagement from Al Qa’ida-influenced terrorist groups*; Horgan, “Individual Disengagement: A psychological analysis,” 17-29; Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*; and Jacobson, Michael, *Terrorist Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left*, (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2010).

<sup>cxli</sup> Vidino, Lorenzo, “Toward a Radical Solution,” *Foreign Policy*, January 5, 2010.

<sup>cxlii</sup> “Admiral: Troops alone will not yield victory in Afghanistan,” *CNN*, September 10, 2008.

<sup>cxliii</sup> Hearne and Laiq. *A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism*, 11.

<sup>cxliv</sup> Boucek, “Deradicalization’: Oasis or Mirage?”