10/6/1989

On October 6, 1989, Secretary of State “James Baker met with his Iraqi counterpart, Tariq Aziz, and promised that the [H.W.] Bush administration would not tighten restrictions on high-technology exports to Iraq.”

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Page 81

10/15/1989

“…in October 1989 the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a private research foundation, issued a report entitled ‘The Genie Unleashed,’ which cataloged Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons production and suggested that the West might already have lost the battle to halt the proliferation of such weapons. The report stated: ‘Significantly, Iraq has continued and even expanded its efforts since the cessation of fighting with Iran in July 1988,’ and went on to say that international efforts to undermine the chemical weapons program by starving it of raw materials were increasingly irrelevant as Iraq was on the verge of becoming self-sufficient. ‘Baghdad’s willingness to invest substantial resources in its chemical and biological weapons programs suggests that its leaders believe that these programs will continue to be of tremendous strategic importance.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Con Coughlin, Saddam: His Rise and Fall, Page 243

10/31/1989

“By this time, international bankers had cut off virtually all loans to the Iraqi dictator [Saddam Hussein]. But on October 31, 1989, [Secretary of State] James Baker called the secretary of agriculture, Clayton Yeutter, and pressed for a billion dollars in new agricultural loan guarantees for Iraq. State Department officials were aware that Iraq was diverting some of its dual-use technology to its nuclear weapons program, yet it decided not to tighten export licenses.”

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Page 81

11/14/1989

At the conclusion of a symposium titled ‘United States Commercial, Economic, and Strategic Interests in Iraq,’ on November 14, 1989, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Peter Burleigh said, “The [H.W. Bush] Administration looks ‘to those in the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum to help preserve and expand the overall U.S.-Iraqi relationship through its commercial side, as only the private sector can do.’ “

 – Antonia Juhasz, The Bush Agenda, Page 159

11/15/1989

In November 1989, “according to a declassified State Department report, intelligence officials reported that Iraq was diverting dual-use American exports to military projects and using front companies to acquire nuclear technology. Undeterred, [James] Baker’s State Department and [Brent] Scowcroft’s NSC [National Security Council] secured $1 billion in loan guarantees for Iraq that same month.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq, Pages 41-42

11/24/1989

“As the Soviets leave Afghanistan, a dispute breaks out among the ‘Afghan Arabs’ over the best use of the fortune that continues to pour in. [Palestinian cleric Abdullah] Azzam wants to use the money to set up an Islamic regime in Kabul. Osama bin Laden wants to use it for a worldwide jihad against the West. Mysteriously, Azzam and his two sons are murdered in a car bombing [on November 24, 1989]. Though bin Laden professes grief, intelligence analysts believe he was responsible. Within months, with the support of his Egyptian allies Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mohammed Atef, and Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, bin Laden takes over Azzam’s Services Office network, using it as a grid for his new terror network, al Qaeda.”

 – Peter Lance, Triple Cross, (Timeline) Page 3

11/24/1989

After the defeat of the invading Soviets in Afghanistan, there was a power struggle between Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda co-founder Sheik Abdullah Azzam as to how to use the funds they raised, as well as the mujahadeen. “On November 24, 1989, Azzam and his two sons were killed by a car bomb in Peshawar [Pakistan] as they drove to juma (Friday prayers). The murders remain unsolved, and although he expressed public grief at their deaths, some U.S. intelligence officials believe that Osama bin Laden himself gave the order for the hit.”

 – Peter Lance, 1000 Years For Revenge, Page 41

11/24/1989

On November 24, 1989, a remotely controlled car bomb killed Abdullah Azzam, one of the leaders of the Mektab al Khidmat (MAK). “The outcome left Bin Ladin indisputably in charge of what remained of the MAK and al Qaeda.”

 – 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, Page 56

11/24/1989

“On November 24, 1989, [Palestinian cleric and mentor of Osama bin Laden, Abdullah] Azzam rode to the mosque [in Peshawar, Pakistan] with his sons, Ibrahim and Mohammed, who was the driver. As Mohammed was parking, a roadside bomb made from twenty kilograms of TNT exploded with such force that the car shattered. …Earlier that Friday, on the streets of Peshawar, Azzam’s main rival, [Egyptian jihadist] Ayman al-Zawahiri, had been spreading rumors that Azzam had been working for the Americans.”

 – Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower, Page 164

11/24/1989

“…on Friday, November 24, 1989, [al-Qaeda co-founder] Abdallah Azzam was killed when a bomb exploded as he was driving down one of Peshawar [Pakistan]‘s main streets. …His enormous legacy has three dimensions: first, the political dimension and Azzam’s role in moving the Afghan conflict from the regional to the global scale; second, the organizational aspect, which highlights Azzam as ‘the father of the Afghan Arabs’; and third, the ideological dimension, with Azzam becoming the preeminent theoretician of global jihad.”

 – Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, eds., Al Qaeda In Its Own Words, Pages 96-97

11/24/1989

In Peshawar, Pakistan, “On November 24, 1989, [al-Qaeda co-founder Abdullah] Azzam put his two sons into his car to go to Friday prayers. He turned the key. The car exploded. There were no survivors. Pakistani investigators were never able to prove that bin Laden was behind the blast, but he was surely its direct beneficiary. He was now the undisputed master of a global network of terror…”

 – Richard Miniter, Losing Bin Laden, Page 13

11/24/1989

“Despite constant rumors, no evidence proves that bin Laden was in any way involved in the [November 24] 1989 assassination of [Islamic scholar/bin Laden mentor Sheik Abdullah] Azzam and his two sons.”

 – Michael Scheuer, Osama Bin Laden, Page 59

11/24/1989

“After the [Afghan-Russian] war ended, and al-Qaeda was looking to move their movement global, there were attempts on [al-Qaeda co-founder] Abdullah Azzam’s life. On November 24, 1989, Azzam and his two sons were killed when three land mines detonated as a motor caravan was taking them to the mosque in Peshawar [Pakistan] to pray. There have been many speculations as to the guilty party, but most believe [Egyptian jihadist Ayman al-] Zawahiri to be the mastermind of the assassination.”

 – Najwa bin Laden, Omar bin Laden, and Jean Sasson, Growing Up Bin Laden, Page 78

11/24/1989

“On November 24, 1989, Azzam and his two sons were murdered in a car bombing on their way to Friday prayers. The triple homicide has never been solved, and bin Laden officially professed grief over the incident. But the EIJ [Egyptian Islamic Jihad] knew that Azzam was the one man standing between bin Laden and the capital he needed. So, in what amounted to little more than a mob takeover, the Egyptians cemented their position with bin Laden at the top of the jihad power structure. They have dominated the war on terror ever since.”

 – Peter Lance, Triple Cross, Page 46

12/8/1989

On December 8, 1989, terrorist El Sayyid Nosair threw a Pepsi can filled with explosives at Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s motorcade in Manhattan. “It failed to detonate. A nearby police officer witnessed the attempt and grabbed Nosair as he walked away. But the cop figured Nosair was just another angry protestor tossing an empty soda can, and Nosair was slapped with nothing more than a warning. Only years later did investigators learn, from an informant, about the can’s lethal contents.”

 – John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, The Cell, Page 52

12/15/1989

“During the same period that the [Afghan President Najibullah’s Administration’s defense minister Shahnawaz] Tanai coup was being planned–around December 1989–Pakistani intelligence reached out to bin Laden for money to bribe legislators to throw [Pakistani Prime Minister] Benazir Bhutto out of office, according to reports that later reached Bhutto. According to Bhutto, ISI [Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence] officers telephoned bin Laden in Saudi Arabia and asked him to fly to Pakistan to help organize a no-confidence vote in parliament against Bhutto’s government, the first step in a Pakistan army plan to remove her forcibly from office.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, Page 212

1/15/1990

“In January 1990, President [George H.W.] Bush waived congressional restrictions on Iraq’s use of the Export-Import Bank and in doing so overlooked new evidence that Iraq was testing ballistic missiles and stealing nuclear technology. All told, the Reagan and Bush administrations ended up providing Saddam Hussein with more than $5 billion in loan guarantees. In the end, American support had enabled the repressive dictator to become a major military force in the Persian Gulf. Saddam had chemical weapons and a nuclear arms program. There were now a million men in the Iraqi army.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Pages 81-82

1/15/1990

After the purchase of George W. Bush’s oil company Spectrum 7 by Harken Energy, Bush was offered a spot on the Harken board. “In January 1990, by which time the elder George Bush had become president, Harken came into another stroke of unexpected good luck. The beleaguered oil company had had no offshore drilling experience whatsoever and had never even drilled outside the borders of the United States. Nevertheless, tiny Harken stunned industry analysts by beating out giant Amoco to win exclusive offshore drilling rights in Bahrain–thanks to yet another BCCI [Bank of Credit and Commerce International] stockholder, the prime minister of Bahrain, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa. …No one in the oil industry doubted that the Bahrain deal happened solely because Bush’s father was president. Moreover, George W. Bush was one of its greatest beneficiaries and profited handsomely from it.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Page 122

1/17/1990

“…the U.S. Congress had imposed U.S. Export-Import Bank financing restrictions on Iraq because of the Halabja massacre [in which chemical weapons were used on Kurds in March 1988]. On January 17, 1990, [President George H.W.] Bush voided the prohibition with a stroke of the pen, stating that it was ‘not in the national interest of the U.S.’ [Secretary of State James] Baker then described trade as the ‘central factor in the U.S.-Iraq relationship.’ During the Bush-Baker tenure, the United States became Iraq’s largest supplier of nonmilitary goods, and Iraq became the United States[‘] second biggest trading partner in the Middle East.”

 – Antonia Juhasz, The Bush Agenda, Page 171

2/11/1990

” ‘By nature, I’m very cautious about the use of the armed forces…putting lives on the line,’ he [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell] had told a reporter [on February 11, 1990] just days before the invasion [of Iraq]. ‘But when it’s clear we’re going to use them, well, let’s use them.’ ”

 – Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell, Page 184

2/15/1990

“Beginning in February 1990, strong words began to fly from Iraq to Kuwait City [Kuwait] and Riyadh [Saudi Arabia], with a cash-desperate Saddam Hussein demanding that the Kuwaitis and Saudis forgive the $40 billion in loans given to him to fight [Ayatollah] Khomeini and the Iranians. …the Kuwaiti and Saudi governments rejected his request and Saddam became aggressive, demanding an additional $30 billion in interest-free loans [saying, at the Arab Cooperation Council meeting that month]: ‘Let the Gulf regimes know, that if they do not give this money to me, I know how to get it.’ That’s when the Iraqi dictator put his huge army on the move, positioning 100,000 trained soldiers on the Kuwaiti border. When questioned, he claimed that his army was conducting training exercises.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Najwa bin Laden, Omar bin Laden, and Jean Sasson, Growing Up Bin Laden, Pages 79-80

2/23/1990

In The Iraq War Reader, Murray Waas wrote: “On February 23, 1990, the Commerce Department allowed Internal Imaging Systems, a California company, to ship computer and related equipment to Iraq that is designed for infrared imaging enhancement. The export license was allowed despite the fact that three years earlier, CIA technical evaluations determined that the imaging system could be used for near real-time tracking of missiles.”

 – Eds. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, The Iraq War Reader, Page 36

3/15/1990

“A number of arrests were made in London in March 1990 of people connected to Iraq’s attempts to procure essential elements for a nuclear weapons programme.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, Page 42

4/1/1990

On April 1, 1990, “Several months before the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had threatened to ‘burn half of Israel.’ Most observers took this as a threat indicating Saddam’s willingness to use chemical weapons.”

 – Stephen F. Hayes, Cheney, Page 242

4/2/1990

“By the spring of 1990, Saddam Hussein’s love affair with the White House had survived ten years of the Reagan-[H.W.] Bush era…But on April 2 [1990], Saddam made the kind of slip of the tongue of which diplomatic catastrophes are borne, boasting that he had chemical weapons and would use them to ‘make fire eat up half of Israel.’ [Secretary of State] James Baker’s State Department immediately issued a statement saying the remarks were, ‘inflammatory, irresponsible, and outrageous.’ ”

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Page 130

4/2/1990

The Riegle Report was delivered by Donald Riegle (D-MI) to the Senate on February 9, 1994, regarding the health of Gulf War veterans. It read: “According to some sources, Iraq used mixed agent weapons combining cyanogen, mustard gas, and tabun against the Kurds. Saddam Hussein stated on April 2, 1990, that Iraq had ‘double combined chemical’ weapons since the last year of the Iran-Iraq War.”

 – Donald Wayne Riegle, Jr. and Alfonse M. D’Amato, The Riegle Report, May 25, 1994, Page 14

4/2/1990

” ‘By God,’ he [Saddam Hussein] vowed in a [April 2] 1990 speech threatening to use chemical weapons against Israel, ‘we will make fire eat up half of Israel if it tries to do anything against Iraq.’ ”

 – Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq, Page 22

4/3/1990

According to an April 3, 1990, article in The New York Times, Saddam Hussein “announced that he had new, more powerful chemical weapons. He threatened to ‘make fire eat half of Israel if it tries to do anything against Iraq.’ ”

 – Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek, Page 59

4/5/1990

Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar met with Saddam Hussein on April 5, 1990, three days after Saddam threatened to ‘make fire eat up half of Israel.’ “When Bandar sat down with Saddam, the Iraqi dictator insisted that he had been misinterpreted. ‘I want to assure President [George H.W.] Bush and His Majesty King Fahd [of Saudi Arabia] that I will not attack Israel,’ he said.”

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Page 131

4/12/1990

“…on April 12, 1990, Senator Bob Dole [R-KS] and a party of five other senators from agricultural states met with Saddam and provided a message from President George H. W. Bush addressing human rights and WMD and assuring the Iraqi president that Washington wanted better relations.”

 – Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek, Page 59

4/15/1990

“By April 1990, the Reagan Administration had:
*Approved exports that ‘allowed Iraq to extend SCUD range far enough to hit allied soldiers in Saudi Arabia and Israeli civilians in Tel Aviv and Haifa.’
*Provided Iraq with deadly bacteria such as anthrax and a source of botulism.”
[The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Philip Taylor, The War in Iraq, Page 15

4/15/1990

“In April [1990], British customs officials stopped another illegal shipment bound for Iraq, in this case elements of an artillery system or super gun…that in principle could have been used for launching a chemical munition over a significant distance.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice, Page 50

5/10/1990

“In early May 1990, [future World Trade Center bombing conspirator] Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman’s representatives walked into the U.S. embassy…in Khartoum [Sudan] and sought an entry visa for him to the United States. Sheikh Rahman, at the behest of the Egyptian authorities, had been on a terrorist watch list for his role in the assassination of [President] Anwar es-Sadat and his involvement with the al-Jihad movement since 1987. On May 10, 1990, Rahman was granted a one-year visa to enter the United States.”

 – Samuel M. Katz, Relentless Pursuit, Page 53

7/15/1990

In July 1990, “The CIA helps [future World Trade Center bombing conspirator] Sheikh Rahman enter the United States by approving his visa in Sudan even though he is on a U.S. Watch List.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Peter Lance, Triple Cross, (Timeline) Page 4

7/15/1990

Future World Trade Center bombing conspirator Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman arrived in New York in July 1990. “Even though he’d been on a U.S. terrorism Watch List for three years, the Sheikh was granted a visa to enter America.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Peter Lance, 1000 Years For Revenge, Pages 42, 43

7/15/1990

In July 1990, Saddam Hussein “accused Kuwait of siphoning off Iraqi oil and massed troops along the border.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Jonathan Randal, Osama, Page 104

7/15/1990

“In mid-July [1990], Iraqi tanks began moving toward Kuwait, and by July 19 our satellite photos showed three heavy armored divisions within striking distance of the Kuwait border.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Dick Cheney, In My Time, Page 182

7/17/1990

In his National Day address on July 17, 1990, Saddam Hussein “directly threatened his neighbors and explicitly referred to Iraq’s chemical weapons. He said Iraq had defended the Arab States against the Persians and then been stabbed with a poison dagger. The day before, in a memorandum to the secretary general of the Arab League, Saddam had equated Kuwait’s actions with military aggression toward Iraq.”

 – Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek, Page 64

7/18/1990

As Iraq built up troops on the Kuwaiti border, “The State Department declared on July 18 [1990] that the United States remained ‘determined to ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz and to defend the principle of freedom of navigation. We also remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the Gulf with whom we have deep and longstanding ties.’ ”

 – Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice, Page 56

7/19/1990

“On July 19, 1990, State [Department] sent a memo to [Secretary of State James] Baker advising stricter controls because Saddam was developing chemical and biological weapons and was working on nuclear weapons. ‘Iraq has been attempting to obtain items to support these proliferation activities from U.S. exporters, in some cases successfully,’ said the memo…’including seventeen licenses for bacteria that could be used with biological weapons and computers for chemical and weapons programs.’ ”

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Page 131

7/19/1990

On July 19, 1990, after Iraq had stationed troops on the Kuwaiti border, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney “offered a public warning to Saddam Hussein. ‘We take very seriously any threat that could risk U.S. interests or U.S. friends in the region,’ he told reporters. ‘That’s a part of the world you’ve got to be concerned about and where you have to take into account the possibility that at some future date U.S. forces could become involved in conflict.’ ”

 – Stephen F. Hayes, Cheney, Page 225

7/20/1990

Then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney wrote: “On July 20 [1990], the two of them [Israeli defense minister Moshe Arens and deputy chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces Ehud Barak] took seats at the small round table in my office, and pulling papers and maps out of their briefcases, they presented evidence of the advanced stage of the Iraqi nuclear program. Access to European technology, they believed, was helping the Iraqis speed completion of a uranium enrichment facility, and we had a narrow window of time in which to stop the program. …I took very seriously what Arens and Barak had to say–particularly since they described a program much further advanced than the one portrayed in our intelligence assessments.”

 – Dick Cheney, In My Time, Page 182

7/25/1990

“On July 25 [1990], he [Secretary of State James Baker] asked Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher for new controls over exports [of U.S. technology to Iraq]. ‘Iraq’s extraordinarily aggressive weapons proliferation efforts make this situation urgent,’ wrote Baker.”

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Page 131

7/25/1990

On July 25, 1990, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, told Saddam Hussein ” ‘I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.’ ”

 – Special to The New York Times, “Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy,” The New York Times, Sep. 23, 1990

7/25/1990

Saddam Hussein “summoned [U.S.] Ambassador [April] Glaspie to see him at noon on Wednesday, July 25, 1990 (a week before the [Kuwait] invasion), which was highly irregular. Saddam, with [Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister] Tariq Aziz present, referred to the potential military threat the United States could launch. …Glaspie did not react to it. …Glaspie had no instruction on this point… Glaspie heard Saddam reiterate that he was pursuing negotiations and that he wanted good relations with the United States. She decided things were not critical and left Baghdad for her annual home leave. …None of Saddam’s advisors told him if Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States would…deploy a half-million soldiers to the region to expel Iraq from Kuwait.”

 – Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek, Page 65

7/25/1990

“In response to Iraqi troop movements along the border with Kuwait, the State Department dispatched Ambassador [April] Glaspie to mollify Saddam. At a July 25, 1990 meeting, the Iraqi leader predicted to Glaspie that America would not oppose his aims because ‘yours is a society that cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle.’ To which Glaspie replied, ‘we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait. …[Secretary of State] James Baker has directed our official spokesman to emphasize this instruction.’ ”

 – Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq, Page 42

7/25/1990

“On July 25 [1990], President Saddam Hussein of Iraq summoned the United States Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, to his office in the last high-level contact between the two Governments before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2.” Hussein said: ” ‘The United States wants to secure the flow of oil. This is understandable and known. But it must not deploy methods which the United States says it disapproves of–flexing muscles and pressure. If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you.’ ”

 – Special to The New York Times, “Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy,” The New York Times, Sep. 23, 1990

7/25/1990

“On July 25 [1990], President Saddam Hussein of Iraq summoned the United States Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, to his office in the last high-level contact between the two Governments before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2.” In defense of his buildup of troops at the Kuwaiti border, Hussein said: ‘It is not reasonable to ask our people to bleed rivers of blood for eight years then to tell them, *Now you have to accept aggression from Kuwait, the U.A.E. [United Arab Emirates] or from the U.S. or from Israel.* We do not put all these countries in the same boat. First, we are hurt and upset that such disagreement is taking place between us and Kuwait and the U.A.E. The solution must be found within an Arab framework and through direct bilateral relations. We do not place America among the enemies. We place it where we want our friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated American statements last year made it apparent that America did not regard us as friends.’ ”

 – Special to The New York Times, “Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy,” The New York Times, Sep. 23, 1990

7/25/1990

“On July 25 [1990], President Saddam Hussein of Iraq summoned the United States Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, to his office in the last high-level contact between the two Governments before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2.” Glaspie told Hussein: ” ‘My assessment after 25 years’ service in this area is that your objective must have strong backing from your Arab brothers. I now speak of oil. But you, Mr. President, have fought through a horrific and painful war. Frankly, we can only see that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the U.A.E. [United Arab Emirates] and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned. And for this reason, I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship–not in the spirit of confrontation–regarding your intentions. I simply describe the concern of my Government. And I do not mean that the situation is a simple situation. But our concern is a simple one.’ ”

 – Special to The New York Times, “Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy,” The New York Times, Sep. 23, 1990

7/25/1990

“Unable to pay back the $14 billion he had borrowed from Kuwait [to fund the Iran-Iraq War], Saddam attempted to raise the price of oil through OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), but Kuwait responded by increasing the flow from its own massive oil fields, which kept world prices low. Outraged by that action, plus the fact that Kuwait refused to waive Iraq’s debt, Saddam amassed his military forces along the Kuwait border in late July 1990…” [The 25th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Ricardo S. Sanchez with Donald T. Phillips, Wiser in Battle, Page 63

7/25/1990

Ambassador April Glaspie to President Saddam Hussein during a documented exchange on July 25, 1990: “I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.
I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 60’s. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via [Arab League Secretary General Chedli] Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly.”

– Special to The New York Times, “CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF; Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy,” New York Times, September 23, 1990

7/27/1990

On July 27, 1990, President George H.W. Bush sent a personal cable to Saddam Hussein, “just five days before the invasion of Kuwait, in which Bush expressed concern but added, ‘Let me reassure you that my administration continues to desire better relations with Iraq.’ ”

 – Antonia Juhasz, The Bush Agenda, Page 172

7/27/1990

“It would be crazy to think that if … Iraq … sends its five hundred thousand troops in that we’re going to send troops over there and defend Kuwait.’ [From] Fred Barnes (Senior Editor: The New Republic), The McLaughlin Group, July 27, 1990″

 – Eds. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, The Iraq War Reader, Page 72

7/28/1990

On July 28, 1990, President George H.W. Bush sent a letter to Saddam Hussein, which read: ” ‘…my Administration continues to desire better relations with Iraq. We will also continue to support our other friends in the region with whom we have had long-standing ties. We see no necessary inconsistency between these two objectives.’ ”

 – Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq, Page 43

7/31/1990

In The Iraq War Reader, Murray Waas wrote: “Only two days before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait [on Aug. 2, 1990], a Pennsylvania firm, Homestead Engineering, obtained a Commerce Department license to export forges and computer equipment that can be used in the manufacture of 16-inch gun barrels. Such guns could deliver huge payloads to targets hundreds of miles away.”

 – Eds. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, The Iraq War Reader, Page 36

8/1/1990

“At 9:00 P.M. On August 1, 1990, Iraqi forces crossed into Kuwait.”

 – Antonia Juhasz, The Bush Agenda, Page 172

8/1/1990

“After Hussein’s forces did invade the small oil-rich state [of Kuwait] on August 1, 1990, and threaten the security of Saudi Arabia, bin Laden immediately volunteered his services and those of his holy warriors. The Saudi army and his own men would be enough to defend the Kingdom. …The Saudis did not take this offer seriously. …They turned instead for help to the U.S. government and then-President [H.W.] Bush, who had made his fortune in the oil trade and so understood exactly what was at stake in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.”

 – Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Pages 80-81

8/2/1990

“Intelligence sources believe it is ‘likely’ [future World Trade Center bomber Ramzi] Yousef was in Kuwait when Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces invaded the Emirate in August [2] 1990. Angry at the corrupt and racist Kuwaiti government, which treated guest-workers as second-class citizens, Yousef–like many Palestinians in the country–is believed to have aided the Iraqi invaders.”

 – Simon Reeve, The New Jackals, Page 121

8/2/1990

“On August 2 [1990], Iraq invades Kuwait. ‘This will not stand,’ says President George H.W. Bush. As the United States and Saudi Arabia prepare for war against Iraq, Osama bin Laden warns the House of Saud not to invite American troops into Saudi Arabia and offers his Afghan Arab warriors instead. He is rebuffed.”

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Page 33

8/2/1990

“In reality, U.S. support for Iraq lasted only until August 2, 1990, when Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait. America not only went to war with Saddam, but out of concern that he might go on to invade Saudi Arabia, the United States stationed troops in the desert kingdom.”

 – Eugene Jarecki, The American Way of War, Page 102

8/2/1990

“…on August 2, 1990, Saddam unleashed the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard divisions that had been mobilized to the Kuwaiti border. Iraqi forces swarmed into Kuwait and quickly occupied the entire country, looting and pillaging whatever they could.”

 – Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek, Page 66

8/2/1990

“In August [2] 1990, Saddam ordered the invasion to Kuwait, proclaiming it as Iraq’s 19th province.”

 – “Profile: Former Iraqi Leader Saddam Hussein,” China Daily, June 30, 2004

8/2/1990

“…Iraq’s army dug in along the Kuwaiti border in late July 1990… Among the reasons offered for Baghdad’s ‘saber-rattling’ was that Saddam meant to pressure OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] into raising oil prices; that he sought to erase $2 billion in debt owed to Kuwait; that he wanted to lease tiny Kuwaiti islands in the Gulf; and that he wished to persuade the Kuwaitis to reach an accommodation over a disputed oilfield along the border. In the days leading up to the war, progress was made on all of these issues. Yet, on August 2 [1990], Saddam invaded anyway. With the aid of several armored divisions, amphibious landings and helicopters ferrying special forces into Kuwait City, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi troops poured across the border. In a matter of hours, the country was theirs.”

 – Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq, Page 19

8/2/1990

On August 2, 1990, “the very day of the [Iraqi] invasion [of Kuwait], the U.N. Security Council approved a resolution condemning the aggression and demanding ‘that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally.’ Over the following days, the Security Council would vote unanimously to ban trade with Iraq; Arab leaders would agree to dispatch a pan-Arab force to defend Saudi Arabia; and the United States and the Soviet Union would demand that Iraqi forces quit Kuwait.”

 – Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq, Pages 19-20

8/2/1990

“The invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein caught the U.S. intelligence community by surprise once again. In a familiar but worrisome pattern, intelligence indicating the possibility of the invasion was not properly analyzed or was discounted by senior [H.W.] Bush administration officials, including then-secretary of defense Dick Cheney, who did not think that Hussein would be foolish enough to do it. General Lee Butler, the commander of the Strategic Air Command, was later quoted as saying, ‘We had the warning from the intelligence community–we refused to acknowledge it.’ ”

 – Matthew M. Aid, The Secret Sentry, Page 192

8/2/1990

“…eager to pull Kuwait back into Iraq (the two had been separated by Great Britain in 1913), desiring of its vast oil reserves, and perhaps itching to demonstrate his own immense military power, Saddam Hussein launched the invasion at 2:00 a.m. on August 2, 1990. More than 120,000 Iraqi forces participated in the operation, including armored, mechanized, and motorized infantry divisions, special commando forces, squadrons of helicopters and fighter-bombers, and members of the elite Republican Guard. Kuwait’s meager 16,000-man army was easily beaten and, after only two days of fighting, its monarchy was overthrown, its government dissolved, and Saddam Hussein announced that Kuwait was now Iraq’s nineteenth province.”

 – Ricardo S. Sanchez with Donald T. Phillips, Wiser in Battle, Page 64

8/2/1990

UN Security Council Resolution 660, which demanded that Iraq ‘withdraw immediately and unconditionally’ from Kuwait, was passed 14-0-1 on August 2 [1990] with no real opposition (only Yemen, then occupying the rotating ‘Arab seat’ on the Security Council, abstained) and little delay.”

 – Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice, Pages 60-61

8/5/1990

“On August 5 [1990], President [H.W.] Bush stepped off Marine One on the White House lawn and, referring to the Iraqi invasion, uttered the most famous words of his presidency: ‘This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.’ The spontaneous remark meant one thing: war.”

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Page 133

8/5/1990

Immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in early August 1990, Osama bin Laden made an offer to Prince Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Defense, to “use his family’s construction business to ring the border of Iraq with new fortifications and…supply thousands of Muslim veterans from the Afghan war to defend the oil kingdom. In return, Saudi Arabia had to forgo an American military presence. …He claimed that allowing non-Muslims into the kingdom violated a well-known passage in the Koran that says that ‘there shall be no two religions in Arabia.’ He repeated his offer to the director of the Saudi General Intelligence Department, Prince Turki al-Faisal. He presented a detailed alternative plan: an army of thousands of Arab Afghans fighting a guerilla/terrorist war against Iraq’s massive army. When his plan was rejected, his hatred of America and the Saudi royal family deepened.” [The 5th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Richard Miniter, Losing Bin Laden, Pages 13-14

8/5/1990

“…after Saddam’s forces invaded Kuwait [in early August 1990], bin Laden immediately volunteered the services of his ‘holy warriors,’ who had recently returned from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, to defend Saudi Arabia. The fact that bin Laden was willing to lead his own troops into battle against Saddam hardly suggested a desire to ally himself with the Iraqi dictator–rather, it underlined the contempt that bin Laden had long felt for him.” [The 5th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Peter Bergen, The Longest War, Page 133

8/6/1990

On August 6, 1990, “Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney flew to Riyadh [Saudi Arabia] at the head of an American delegation and read out to King Fahd bin Adbul Aziz and the senior Saudi princes a message from President George [H.W.] Bush. ‘We are prepared to deploy these forces to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,’ the message said. ‘If you ask us to come we will come. We seek no permanent bases. And when you ask us to leave, we will go home.’ ”

 – Jonathan Randal, Osama, Pages 105-106

8/6/1990

“The UN Security Council reacted swiftly with the imposition of sanctions and an oil embargo on Iraq…on August 6, 1990. These measures were linked to Iraq’s withdrawing from Kuwait. As…the reaction on the part of the United States became more explicit, Saddam gave a speech attacking foreign countries that occupied holy places.”

 – Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek, Page 67

8/6/1990

On August 6, 1990, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, “the United Nations Security Council voted to impose full economic sanctions on Iraq, stopping oil exports and prohibiting all imports except food and medicine.”

 – Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell, Page 195

8/7/1990

“Operation Desert Shield–later Operation Desert Storm–drew more than a half a million U.S. soldiers to the Gulf [starting August 7, 1990]. …By the start of 1991, bin Laden was already talking of leaving Saudi Arabia for the ultra-Islamist state of Sudan.”

 – Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Pages 80-81

8/7/1990

“On August 7, 1990, the United States began sending the most sophisticated and powerful fighting machine in the history of the world into the ancient desert kingdom of Saudi Arabia. …Tens of thousands of American soldiers–blacks, Asians, Christians, Jews, even women–made their way into a tribal, male-dominated Arab culture that had never seen anything of the like. For millions of Muslims, the U.S. presence was a humiliation of Islam that called forth visions of invading Christians and Jews. A rising tide of anti-Americanism and animus against the House of Saud swept through the kingdom.”

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Pages 144-146

8/7/1990

“Opposition to the long-time presence of Americans on the Arabian peninsula intensified dramatically after August 7, 1990, the day that the first U.S. troops were dispatched to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield. The dying edict of the Prophet Muhammad had been ‘Let there be no two religions in Arabia’; now ‘infidels’ of both sexes were trespassing on the holy land of the Arabian Peninsula.”

 – Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Page 80

8/8/1990

After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, “On August 8, 1990, President George H.W. Bush ordered American troops to the region, ostensibly to prevent an invasion of Saudi Arabia. Operation Desert Shield was now under way. Eventually, that movement resulted in the buildup of approximately 500,000 U.S. forces over the next five months.”

 – Ricardo S. Sanchez with Donald T. Phillips, Wiser in Battle, Page 64

8/8/1990

In a speech on Aug. 8, 1990, President George H.W. Bush said: “The mission of our troops is wholly defensive … [It] is not the mission, to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait.”

 – Eds. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, The Iraq War Reader, Page 74

8/15/1990

“When Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, bin Laden offered the Saudi government his thousands of mujahedin fighters. Rather than accept his offer, Saudi Arabia instead allowed U.S. soldiers on its soil to serve as its defenders. This decision infuriated him, and he began to criticize the Saudi regime openly. …Bin Laden had gone from being an ally of both the United States and Saudi Arabia to being their enemy…” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Bob Graham with Jeff Nussbaum, Intelligence Matters, Page 29

8/15/1990

Former Iraqi general Georges Sada wrote: “I learned from a close family member of a high-ranking Iraqi official that Saddam made arrangements in August 1990 to acquire nuclear weapons directly from a group of nuclear scientists in China. After the invasion of Kuwait [on August 2, 1990], Saddam realized that scrutiny of his weapons programs was going to be much too intense for Iraq to continue nuclear development, and it would have been next to impossible to maintain secrecy. So he made a deal to pay the Chinese scientists $100 million to manufacture weapons for him.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Georges Sada with Jim Nelson Black, Saddam’s Secrets, Page 257

8/15/1990

“On August 15 [1990], President Bush declared, ‘Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein.’ To this, Secretary [of State James] Baker added, ‘The economic lifeline of the industrial world runs from the Gulf and we cannot permit a dictator such as this to sit astride that economic lifeline.’ ”

 – Antonia Juhasz, The Bush Agenda, Page 172

8/15/1990

“…in August 1990 [Saddam’s son-in-law, General Hussein] Kamel had ordered a crash program to make a nuclear weapon, using fissionable material from research reactor fuel that was under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards. That program had failed.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq, Page 30

8/15/1990

“Back in August 1990, the Iraqi leader had sent armed forces into the neighboring country of Kuwait. This was a small country that had become very wealthy because of it’s huge reserves of petroleum (oil). Saddam’s troops quickly occupied Kuwait, and it became a province (territory) of Iraq.” [The 15th of the month for date sorting purpose only]

 – Andrew Langley, Bush, Blair, and Iraq: Days of Decision, Page 6

8/15/1990

On August 15, 1990, days after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President [H.W.] Bush declared: “Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of that one man, Saddam Hussein.”

– “Remarks to Department of Defense Employees,” The American Presidency Project, Presidency.UCSB.edu, August 15, 1990

8/16/1990

“On August 1, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Days later [August 16, 1990], President [H.W.] Bush declared, ‘Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein.’ ”

 – Antonia Juhasz, The Tyranny of Oil, Pages 327-328

9/11/1990

Speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 11, 1990, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said: ” ‘Once […Iraqi President Saddam Hussein] acquired Kuwait and deployed an army as large as the one he possesses, he was clearly in a position to be able to dictate the future of worldwide energy policy, and that gave him a stranglehold on our economy and on that of most of the other nations of the world as well…’ ”

 – Michael Klare, “US: Procuring the World’s Oil,” Asia Times, April 27, 2004

9/15/1990

According to a March 11, 1992, classified GAO (United States Government Accounting Office) report titled, ‘Iraq: U.S. Military Items Exported or Transferred to Iraq in the 1980s,’ “Iraq was again added to the [U.S.] terrorist list in September 1990.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – U.S. General Accounting Office, “Iraq: U.S. Military Items Exported or Transferred to Iraq in the 1980s, GAO/NSIAD-94-98” Federation of American Scientists, Feb. 7, 1994, Page 4

9/15/1990

A critic of the Saudi government, Islamic scholar Sheikh Safar bin Abd al-Rahman “Al-Hawali, who had written a book called Kissinger’s Promise, about the West’s treacherous efforts to control Arab oil resources, explained the Gulf War in September 1990 to a crowd in a Riyadh [Saudi Arabia] mosque as another step in the conspiracy, saying, ‘It is not the world against Iraq….It is the West against Islam.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]

 – Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, Page 107

9/16/1990

From a Washington Post article on September 16, 1990: ” ‘Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein aggressively courted U.S. companies and government agencies. …It was a mutual seduction. The U.S. government bitterly opposed to Iran and its leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeinei, first tilted toward Iraq to ensure that Iran did not win the war; later, it became equally interested in Iraqi oil and trade.’ ”

 – Antonia Juhasz, The Bush Agenda, Page 156

9/24/1990

“As chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he [Colin Powell] had gone to then-President [George H.W.] Bush not to advise him on whether to send Americans into combat [in Iraq] but to make sure the president would make an informed decision. ‘My responsibility that day,’ Powell later wrote of his visit to the White House on September 24, 1990, ‘was to lay out all the options for the nation’s civilian leadership. However, in our democracy it is the president, not the generals, who make decisions about going to war.’ By spelling it all out, ‘I had done my duty.’ ”

 – Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell, Page 402

10/10/1990

On Oct. 10, 1990, Roger Hilsman, Professor of International Politics at Columbia University and former Assistant Secretary of State under President Kennedy, said in a Newsday article: “President George Bush’s decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia and to launch an economic boycott of Iraq is both naive and wildly optimistic. … [T]he best that Bush can expect from his policy is a confrontation stretching into years … And as time goes on, Bush’s support in the Arab world, among the other Western powers, and in America will steadily erode.”

 – Eds. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, The Iraq War Reader, Page 74

11/5/1990

After Egyptian Islamist El Sayyid Nosair was arrested for the assassination of Rabbi Meier Kahane of the right-wing Jewish Defense League on November 5, 1990, 47 boxes of evidence were removed from his home. These boxes “included the recorded sermons of [future World Trade Center bombing conspirator] blind sheikh Omar [Abdel Rahman], in which he exhorted his followers to ‘destroy the edifices of capitalism.’ Entries in one notebook, which Nosair apparently copied from another such sermon, called for the ‘destruction of the enemies of Allah,’ by ‘destroying their…high world buildings.’ ”

 – Peter Lance, 1000 Years For Revenge, Pages 34-35

11/5/1990

“Early in the evening of November 5, 1990, in New York City, Rabbi Meir Kahane, the fiery founder of the militant Jewish Defense League, was appearing at a meeting at the New York Marriott Hotel on West Forty-ninth Street in Manhattan. …As Kahane took questions from the audience, a man of Arab descent with an odd smile on his face suddenly approached and shot Kahane dead with a silver-plated .357 handgun. The man who pulled the trigger, [Islamist] El Sayed Nosair, was…originally from Egypt. …At Nosair’s apartment, police discovered bomb-making materials and instruction manuals on special warfare. They also found a list of potential assassination targets, and maps and photos of many of New York’s landmarks–including the World Trade Center.” It took more than two years to translate documents found in Nosair’s file cabinets which included a document “that appears to be one of the very first bearing the name of bin Laden’s new organization: Al Qaeda.”

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Pages 146-148

11/5/1990

“On November 5 [1990], Rabbi Meir Kahane of the right-wing Jewish Defense League is shot and killed by a militant Islamist [El Sayyid Nosair]. He is the first casualty of Al Qaeda on American soil.”

 – Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, Page 303

11/5/1990

On November 5, 1990, “Rabbi Meier Kahane [of the right-wing Jewish Defense League] is murdered by [Egyptian Islamist] El Sayyid Nosair, another [al Qaeda agent/FBI informant] Ali Mohamed trainee. [Future WTC bombing conspirator, Mahmud] Abouhalima, known as ‘the Red,’ is slated to drive the getaway car.”

 – Peter Lance, Triple Cross, (Timeline) Page 4

11/5/1990

Amongst the evidence collected by the police from Egyptian Islamist/assassin El Sayeed Nosair’s New Jersey apartment on November 5, 1990, (but not translated until after the World Trade Center bombing in February 1993) was “a small, wirebound notebook, [in which] Nosair had written, ‘We have to thoroughly demoralize the enemies of God by means of destroying and blowing up the towers that constitute the pillars of their civilization such as the tourist attractions they are so proud of and the high buildings they are so proud of.’ ”

 – Steven Emerson, American Jihad, Page 44

11/6/1990

After the killing of Rabbi Meier Kahane of the right-wing Jewish Defense League on November 5, 1990, [co-conspirators Mahmud] Abouhalima and [Mohammed] Salameh regrouped at [Egyptian Islamist/assassin El Sayyid] Nosair’s home in Cliffside Park, New Jersey. But they were taken into custody by the NYPD later as material witnesses. The house was raided early the next day [November 6, 1990]. Detectives and FBI agents seized forty-seven boxes in the raid–boxes that included prima facie evidence of an international bombing conspiracy with the World Trade Center as a target.”

 – Peter Lance, Triple Cross, Pages 57-58

11/6/1990

On November 6, 1990, “The night after the [Rabbi Meier] Kahane killing, during their search of [Egyptian Islamist/assassin El Sayyid] Nosair’s house, the Feds had found a notebook in Arabic that threatened the ‘destruction of the enemies of Allah…by means of destroying exploding, the structure of their civilized pillars…and their high world buildings…’ …But JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task Force] investigators didn’t get that message translated until it was far too late.”

 – Peter Lance, Triple Cross, Page 100

11/6/1990

On November 6, 1990, “at [Egyptian Islamist/assassin El Sayyid] Nosair’s New Jersey house, FBI agents and NYPD detectives seize 47 boxes of evidence, including bomb recipes, Arabic writings threatening the WTC, and [al Qaeda member/FBI informant] Ali Mohamed’s top secret memos stolen from Fort Bragg. [Future WTC bombing conspirators Mahmud] Abouhalima and [Mohammed] Salameh are seized as material witnesses but later set free.”

 – Peter Lance, Triple Cross, (Timeline) Page 4

11/6/1990

“Detectives and some FBI agents from JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task Force] carried out 16 boxes of files [from the house of Egyptian Islamist/assassin El Sayyid Nosair on November 6, 1990]. …There were training manuals from the Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg. There were copies of teletypes that had been routed to the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. …There were also bomb-making manuals, as well as maps of landmark locations like the Statue of Liberty, Times Square, Rockefeller Center and the World Trade Center, with notes written in Arabic. …The bulk of the material remained untranslated and unread for nearly three years.”

 – John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, The Cell, Pages 45-46